Stpa, Class exercise
24/9/2012
1_2人一組。
Student name
澳門或香港特區政府近年提供之社會福利不斷增加，是否已經成為福利國家模式？什麼模型較為近似它們目前的狀況？現實上為什麼它們須要加大提供社會福利？這樣發展下去，可能有什麼危機？請您嘗試向本地政府提供一些關於社會福利政策的建議。當中須包括論述一些您認為本地政府必須考慮的政策原則。
（800_1500字左右）
2012年9月23日星期日
Stpa, week 5, notes, dr sunny chan
Stpa, week 5, notes, dr sunny chan
政府、經濟、公民社會、全球化
福利國家、第三條路、發展型國家
Models of governance
Welfare state models （參考，林萬億，2006，＜福利國家：歷史比較的分析＞,第四章）
福利國家階段之前：最低救助，資產審查，貧民救濟。
福利國家的三個模型
@ 俾斯麥模型：德國，十九世紀中期開始，承認自由資本主義帶來的缺點，對個人或家庭之風險。國家行動介入，有需要建立社會保險制度，以男性勞工為主，須要繳交保費。
@ 貝彿里奇模型：英國，二十世紀初期開始，近似凱因斯主義，普及式社會保險，包括所有國民。保險給付劃一，保險費均等。維持國民最低基本生存標準。另提供國民健康服務，作為全國福利服務之例子。
@ 瑞典模式：瑞典，二十世紀初期開始，勞工組織為了整體福利政策目標而廣泛地與其他利益團體尋求妥協和合作。強大工會，勞工參與工會比率高。形成集中化的議價體系制度，促成勞工和平、工作訓練、工作安全等。混合經濟模式包括生產市場自由經濟，大型公共部門進行再分配政策。價格穩定，充分就業（工資水平有各方共識）。受雇者投資基金，改變資本所有權結構。全民保險，政府部分資助支持。退休年金制度成為社會權。工作權，再訓練。不強調失業救濟之現金給付。
免費學校午餐。健康保險。親職保險。
歐洲十八世紀：個人自由、人權、平等、法治 --> 公民權
十九世紀：政治自由 ,投票權 --> 政治權
二十世紀：經濟自由，年金保險 --> 社會權 （所有國民擁有一定之經濟資源、教育、醫療、住宅、福利服務等）
三個福利資本主義世界
@ 自由福利國家：資產調查先於社會救助。弱勢社群才是福利的受益者。階級政治二元化。自由市場地位仍是主流。
@ 歷史組合國家主義：統合主義，大工會、大商會權力大。國家成為福利的主要提供者。社會保險排除家庭主婦。
@ 社會民主體制：福利普及主義，服務去商品化。社會高度公平。所有國民均加入社會保險體系。強調充分就業。婦女走出家庭投入全職工作。家庭成本社會化，政府照顧兒童、老人、無助者。
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第三條路
（美國新民主黨克林頓、英國新工黨布萊爾）
離開傳統的社會民主主義，也不走新自由主義。
@ 強大的公民社會，乃是民主政府及市場機制可以良好運作的必要條件。
政府、經濟制度、公民社會三者，必須在社會團結和社會公義的原則下互相制約。
反對政府中央集權化。削減政府角色。增加「非政府組織」的參與及貢獻。
@ 權利與責任必須平衡，貧者和富者都應接受這概念。社會主義的道德：人們彼此依賴，人們對彼此負有責任。強者有責任照顧弱者。
人們互助合作，造成全體福祉，因而亦帶來個人福祉，社會繁榮。社會各界一起打擊貧窮，一起對付失業問題。
@ 政府強調平等原則，以機會平等為主，輔以適當的結果平等，因此，資源再分配策略是必須的。政府透過社會政策，對資本主義社會進行控制和改革。
讓市民樂於工作，不是等待救濟。支援受助者就業，in-work benefits：support single parent families and low-income workers, child care, re-training.
"Workfare state". Minimum wage policy.
Life-long learning and re-training.
@ supply-side economic policy, 「供應」主導政策，政府把資源投在提高生產力，促進投資等。不是透過公共開支及福利以剌激「需求」。政府可利用市場經濟，來創造財富。
@ 強調個人對家庭之責任，父親有責任供養離婚後之子女。
@ 強化跨國性統理制度，理性及宏觀地控制全球化的負面影響。
\\\\\\\\\
發展型國家，特徵：
@ 威權政治，行政主導，一黨獨大，政府有相對自主性，持續推動政策
@ 理性化官僚，半官方\公司化公共實體，EDB, HDB.
@ 發展型領導，以經濟發展手段來維持政治認受性
@ 適量干預經濟，大量公共投資及扶持政策，培育本地大企業及工業
@ 大量投資基建及教育
\\\\\\\\\\\\
政府、經濟、公民社會、全球化
福利國家、第三條路、發展型國家
Models of governance
Welfare state models （參考，林萬億，2006，＜福利國家：歷史比較的分析＞,第四章）
福利國家階段之前：最低救助，資產審查，貧民救濟。
福利國家的三個模型
@ 俾斯麥模型：德國，十九世紀中期開始，承認自由資本主義帶來的缺點，對個人或家庭之風險。國家行動介入，有需要建立社會保險制度，以男性勞工為主，須要繳交保費。
@ 貝彿里奇模型：英國，二十世紀初期開始，近似凱因斯主義，普及式社會保險，包括所有國民。保險給付劃一，保險費均等。維持國民最低基本生存標準。另提供國民健康服務，作為全國福利服務之例子。
@ 瑞典模式：瑞典，二十世紀初期開始，勞工組織為了整體福利政策目標而廣泛地與其他利益團體尋求妥協和合作。強大工會，勞工參與工會比率高。形成集中化的議價體系制度，促成勞工和平、工作訓練、工作安全等。混合經濟模式包括生產市場自由經濟，大型公共部門進行再分配政策。價格穩定，充分就業（工資水平有各方共識）。受雇者投資基金，改變資本所有權結構。全民保險，政府部分資助支持。退休年金制度成為社會權。工作權，再訓練。不強調失業救濟之現金給付。
免費學校午餐。健康保險。親職保險。
歐洲十八世紀：個人自由、人權、平等、法治 --> 公民權
十九世紀：政治自由 ,投票權 --> 政治權
二十世紀：經濟自由，年金保險 --> 社會權 （所有國民擁有一定之經濟資源、教育、醫療、住宅、福利服務等）
三個福利資本主義世界
@ 自由福利國家：資產調查先於社會救助。弱勢社群才是福利的受益者。階級政治二元化。自由市場地位仍是主流。
@ 歷史組合國家主義：統合主義，大工會、大商會權力大。國家成為福利的主要提供者。社會保險排除家庭主婦。
@ 社會民主體制：福利普及主義，服務去商品化。社會高度公平。所有國民均加入社會保險體系。強調充分就業。婦女走出家庭投入全職工作。家庭成本社會化，政府照顧兒童、老人、無助者。
\\\\\\\\
第三條路
（美國新民主黨克林頓、英國新工黨布萊爾）
離開傳統的社會民主主義，也不走新自由主義。
@ 強大的公民社會，乃是民主政府及市場機制可以良好運作的必要條件。
政府、經濟制度、公民社會三者，必須在社會團結和社會公義的原則下互相制約。
反對政府中央集權化。削減政府角色。增加「非政府組織」的參與及貢獻。
@ 權利與責任必須平衡，貧者和富者都應接受這概念。社會主義的道德：人們彼此依賴，人們對彼此負有責任。強者有責任照顧弱者。
人們互助合作，造成全體福祉，因而亦帶來個人福祉，社會繁榮。社會各界一起打擊貧窮，一起對付失業問題。
@ 政府強調平等原則，以機會平等為主，輔以適當的結果平等，因此，資源再分配策略是必須的。政府透過社會政策，對資本主義社會進行控制和改革。
讓市民樂於工作，不是等待救濟。支援受助者就業，in-work benefits：support single parent families and low-income workers, child care, re-training.
"Workfare state". Minimum wage policy.
Life-long learning and re-training.
@ supply-side economic policy, 「供應」主導政策，政府把資源投在提高生產力，促進投資等。不是透過公共開支及福利以剌激「需求」。政府可利用市場經濟，來創造財富。
@ 強調個人對家庭之責任，父親有責任供養離婚後之子女。
@ 強化跨國性統理制度，理性及宏觀地控制全球化的負面影響。
\\\\\\\\\
發展型國家，特徵：
@ 威權政治，行政主導，一黨獨大，政府有相對自主性，持續推動政策
@ 理性化官僚，半官方\公司化公共實體，EDB, HDB.
@ 發展型領導，以經濟發展手段來維持政治認受性
@ 適量干預經濟，大量公共投資及扶持政策，培育本地大企業及工業
@ 大量投資基建及教育
\\\\\\\\\\\\
2012年9月17日星期一
2012年9月16日星期日
STPA- WEEK4 NOTES- DR SUNNY CHAN
Week 4, stpa, dr sunny chan, 17-9-2012.
Review
Good governance ， but what are the values and perspectives？
自由、民主、尊重人權、公義、法治、問責性、回應性、公共利益（自由主義、功利主義、正義論、社群主義）
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Governance models
Laissez faire state 自由放任型政府
Neo-classical model 新古典模型
Keynesian model 凱恩斯模型
Welfare state 福利國家型
The third way 第三條路模式
Developmental state 發展型國家
Plural state 多元主義模式
Elitist state 精英主義模式
Corporatist state 統合主義\ 社團主義模式
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Laissez-faire
Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
'Laissez-faire' means 'leave to do'; a more colloquial translation might be 'let them get on with it'. Since the late eighteenth century such phrases as 'a laissez-faire policy' and 'laissez-faire economics' have suggested a belief in the virtues of allowing individuals to pursue their interests through market transactions with minimal government interference.
However, laissez-faire in a broad sense, as opposed to the use of the phrase in particular contexts with respect to particular sections of production, is vague and its historical location elusive. Laissez-faire economics is not normally based on libertarian ethics but rather on the utilitarian calculation that absence of interference functions better than interference. But nearly all market theories are also theories of market failure and it is difficult to identify any leading economic thinker who thought that laissez-faire was the best solution to all problems. Adam Smith, for example, did not believe that unregulated markets could provide the kind of educational system which a commercial society needed.
— Lincoln Allison
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Oxford Dictionary of British History:
Laissez-faire
The transition from the medieval to the modern economy was characterized by the progressive removal of restrictions on individuals and groups in favour of the operation of market forces. The balance between complete un-restriction and some control is still strenuously debated. In reality the state of complete laissez-faire has never existed. John Stuart Mill defined what has become accepted as the minimum level of state intervention. Amongst such interventions for the greater good, he included the power to enforce contracts and secure property rights, the administration of justice, the right to tax in order to provide public goods such as transport systems, sanitation and public health, and state-supported education.
While the notion of laissez-faire is usually associated with the decline of the medieval and mercantilist economic regimes, it has an enduring modern counterpart in the views of the neoclassical and new classical economists, who may use different terminology, but whose essential view is that individual freedom to function within un-trammeled markets, with little involvement from government, represents the best type of economic organization. All these strands of thought assert the right of the individual and depict state involvement in the economy as ineffectual or malign.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
Keynesian model --
J M Keynes, (1883-1946) British economist, who made a leading contribution to economic theory, particularly through The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), to economic policy, and to international economic negotiations. The use of the word 'Keynesian' to describe a particular mix of economic and social policy is a reflection of the success of his attempt to provide an intellectual justification for a form of government intervention that would save capitalism and liberal democracy, a task which appeared to be a compelling and urgent one in the 1930s. In a chapter entitled 'Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might Lead', Keynes admits that his theory is moderately conservative in its implications. The state would intervene in some areas, including the use of the tax system to influence the propensity to consume, but wide fields of activity would be unaffected. A comprehensive socialization of investment would be necessary to achieve full employment, but this could be achieved by what would later be called public-private partnerships. There was no obvious case for a comprehensive system of state socialism, and most of the necessary measures could be introduced gradually, and without a general break in the traditions of society.
Keynes was a product of an essentially Victorian milieu which had set aside religious belief, but maintained a strong interest in moral rules of conduct, underpinned by rational justification rather than faith in the existence of a deity. From Eton he went to King's College where he graduated in mathematics and then spent a fourth year reading economics, then dominated by Alfred Marshall and his Principles of Economics. While at Cambridge, Keynes wrote a long prize essay on Burke which gives a good indication of Keynes's developing political beliefs. He emphasized Burke's advocacy of expediency against abstract rights, and, like Burke, he was uncertain about the value of basing action on absolute principles. Keynes supported Burke's view that war should be approached with prudence, and in the First World War he attempted to register as a conscientious objector, but was exempted because of his work at the Treasury. 1919 he published a critique of the Versailles settlement entitled The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which achieved substantial worldwide sales and had a considerable influence on political opinion. Keynes argued that the Versailles settlement would impoverish Europe.
In the early 1920s, Keynes became involved with the Liberal Party. 1926 he became a member of a Liberal Industrial Inquiry, drafting substantial parts of the report on Britain's Industrial Future, better known as the Yellow Book. One of the proposals was that the investment funds of all public concerns should be put into a separate capital budget under the direction of a national investment board. The disappointing performance of the Liberals in 1929, and their reactions to the depression, lessened his enthusiasm for the party. He gave some financial support to individual Labour candidates in the 1930s, and made some favourable comments about Labour policies. When he became a peer 1942 he sat as an independent, although he continued to express some sympathy for the Liberals and gave them a small donation in 1945. As one of Keynes's biographers, Robert Skidelsky, has pointed out, Keynes was a political economist rather than a political animal, someone who was interested in influencing public policy, but who believed that the intellectual argument had to be won before the political argument. Although Keynes wrote extensively for the popular press in the middle period of his life, he was of a generation that believed that rational decision-making could be left to a well-informed elite based in London and the ancient universities. Keynes had the economist's habit of referring to political difficulties as second-order problems for which economists had no professional responsibility to provide solutions. He recognized that full employment could lead to upward pressures on wages, a problem which eventually led economists working in the Keynesian tradition to advocate incomes policies. He argued that the task of keeping wages reasonably stable was a 'political rather than an economic problem', and that the combination of collective bargaining and full employment was an 'essentially political problem' where analytical methods were of little assistance. His involvement in important economic negotiations with the Americans during and immediately after the Second World War showed that he had good negotiating skills, and an awareness of political realities and the need for mutual accommodation. Keynes's advocacy of macroecomic economic management did not provide an enduring solution to the problem of maintaining full employment, even less that of curbing inflation, but no discussion of the politics of economic management in the latter half of the twentieth century can proceed very far without reference to Keynes and his influential, if often ambiguous, ideas.
Wyn Grant
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Investopedia
Neo-classical Model --
An approach to economics that relates supply and demand to an individual's rationality and his or her ability to maximize utility or profit. Neoclassical economics also increased the use of mathematical equations in the study of various aspects of the economy. This approach was developed in the late-nineteenth century, based on books by William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras.
Since its inception, neoclassical economics has grown to become the primary take on modern-day economics. Although it is now the most widely taught form of economics, this school of thought still has its detractors. Most criticism points out that neoclassical economics makes many unfounded and unrealistic assumptions that do not represent real situations. For example, the assumption that all parties will behave rationally overlooks the fact that human nature is vulnerable to other forces, which cause people to make irrational choices. Therefore, many critics believe that this approach cannot be used to describe actual economies.
Neoclassical economics is also sometimes blamed for inequalities in global debt and trade relations because the theory holds that such matters as labor rights will improve naturally, as a result of economic conditions
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Welfare state
[Oxford dictionary of politics]
A system in which the government undertakes the main responsibility for providing for the social and economic security of the state's population by means of pensions, social security benefits, free health care, and so forth. 1942 the Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom proposed a far-reaching 'settlement', as part of a wider social and economic reconstruction, once victory in the Second World War was secured, and became the blueprint for the British welfare state.
By 1944 a White Paper made full employment the first goal of government economic policy, and the Butler Act provided for universal secondary education. Labour, however, won the 1945 general election, to a considerable extent because they appeared more wholeheartedly in favour of the Beveridge plan. The key measures which followed, largely implementing the plan's essential features, were the National Insurance Act 1946, the National Health Service Act 1946, and the National Assistance Act 1948. An ambitious programme to build a million homes was also launched. By 1948 The Times newspaper proclaimed in an editorial that these measures had created 'security from the cradle to the grave' for every citizen.
These measures were the foundation of the 'welfare state', which was seen as synonymous with 'social security'. In a specific sense this meant entitlements to benefits under the newly established national insurance and assistance schemes. In a wider sense it referred to the other reforms implemented at the time, particularly the guarantees of full employment and access to a national health service free at the point of use. Underlying all this, however, was a new conception of the relationship between the state and the individual within a market-based society. This was based on an acceptance of the need for extensive intervention to ensure that its worst effects were mitigated, on the grounds that their causes were systemic rather than the fault or responsibility of individuals.
Nevertheless, behind the apparent consensus on the need for a welfare state, there was political conflict on its meaning between 'reluctant collectivists' in the liberal tradition (such as Beveridge himself) who saw the reforms of the 1940s as a high-water mark, and reformist socialists who saw it as a framework for developing a more concerted shift towards a planned and egalitarian society. A small minority of commentators, such as Hayek, were never convinced of the need for the welfare state in the first place and remained resolutely 'anti-collectivist'.
The growing 'crisis' of the welfare state since the 1970s can be seen as due to changed economic and social circumstances, a disintegration of the post-war consensus, or both of these. Undoubtedly, growing economic pressures were making it harder to meet more insistent demands for improved services, and increased social needs due to changes in family patterns, more older people, and growing numbers of unemployed people. On the other hand, the 'welfare state' had been increasingly criticized within a more polarized political culture. Critics from the right argued that by removing responsibility from the individual, the welfare state stifled people's initiative to solve their own problems. Critics from the left agreed in part that the welfare state as it currently stood was often 'oppressive', but attributed this to a failure to attack the root causes of class, gender, and 'race' inequalities.
Even before 1979 there were discernible shifts by the 1974-9 Labour government after the expenditure crisis of 1976 towards retrenchment and 'restructuring' of welfare in ways that responded most to right-wing rather than left-wing critics. However, after the Conservative election victory of 1979, this shift occurred in a more concerted way and there have been substantial reforms in all of the services established as a result of the Beveridge Report, though only in one, housing, could there be said to have been significant retrenchment in provision. In other areas, there have been a tightening of eligibility rules and shifts to decentralization of managerial responsibility within tighter centralized control of finance. Perhaps most controversial of all has been the reform of the National Health Service in 1990, against widespread opposition, to create an 'internal' market within a socialized system.
In a wider sense, there has been a significant shift from Beveridge's assumptions. Most importantly, there was a shift in economic priorities from maintaining full employment to controlling inflation. The modest redistribution of income and wealth achieved up to the 1970s, was reversed by cuts in income tax and a shift to more regressive forms of indirect taxation like value added tax (VAT). Despite all this, by the end of the 1980s the welfare state had been 'restructured' rather than abolished. It was suggested that a new 'welfare pluralist' consensus had emerged in which it was accepted that private, state, and voluntary sectors could exist side by side. In the 1990s the growing internationalization of the global economy, which has undermined the autonomy of national governments, led to pressure to reduce wage and social security costs in order to attract highly mobile investment.
It is probably most helpful to situate the British variant analytically and comparatively as a 'welfare state regime'. These, G. Esping-Anderson argues in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, fall into three main types within market societies: 'conservative', 'social democratic', and 'liberal', depending on the extent to which they seek to work with, or to counter the effects of, the market on social inequalities. An example of a conservative regime is Germany, characterized by high welfare provision within a hierarchical and ordered society, while Sweden is closest to an egalitarian 'social democratic' regime. Though 1948 the British welfare state was among the most developed, by the 1970s provision had become more extensive in conservative and social democratic regimes, and the British welfare state looked closest to the 'liberal' model, with only limited attempts to use welfare to mitigate social inequalities. Though all welfare state regimes have been under pressure, in Britain and the United States the shift towards liberalism has been particularly pronounced, nor was it reversed on Labour coming to power in 1997.
— Mick Carpenter
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
THE THIRD WAY
Generally, any ideology that claims that it lies in between two traditional approaches that the writer believes are too limited. Specifically, the ideology claimed to underlie the actions of New Labour in Britain after the succession of Tony Blair to the leadership of the Labour Party in 1994. In this case, the two old ways are often understood to be socialism and capitalism. However, both its main ideologue in the UK (Anthony Giddens) and Prime Minister Blair emphasize that it is supposed to be a modernized form of social democracy, rather than an alternative to it.
Although critics of the New Labour Third Way claim that it has no empirical content, its defenders see it as a route between what was seen as the excessive paternalism (and statism) of traditional left policies and the excessive individual personal responsibility of the right. The policy of welfare to work—dubbed 'tough love' by British thirdwayers—was an early example: a combination of a greater emphasis on personal responsibility to find work backed with the threat of withdrawal of benefits, but at the same time a reinforcing of a framework of public support. For a while in the late 1990s, the German Social Democratic Party imitated New Labour with a claim to pursue die neue Mitte, but that claim too disappeared in the 2000s. The concept has a modest salience in the USA where it has become central to the philosophy of the Democratic Leadership Council, the centrist pressure group in the Democrats. See also social exclusion; social market.
— Iain McLean
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Developmental State
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0907/0907.2019.pdf
A developmental state is a state where government is intimately involved in the macro and micro-economic planning in order to grow the economy (Onis, 1991). It has generally been observed that successful developmental states are able to advance their economies much faster than regulatory states that use regulations to manage the economy.
Characteristics of a Developmental State
In order to understand the concept of a developmental state, it is important to highlight some of the characteristics of a developmental state (Thompson, 1996; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Developmental states generally put strong emphasis on technical education and the development of numeracy and computer skills within the population. This technically oriented education is strategically used to capacitate government structures particularly the bureaucracy. What emerges out of this strategy is that the political and bureaucratic layers are populated by extremely educated people who have sufficient tools of analysis to be able to take leadership initiatives, based on sound scientific basis, at every level of decision making nodes within the government structure.
Developmental states have been observed to be able to efficiently distribute and allocate resources and, therefore, invest optimally in critical areas that are the basis of industrialisation such as education. The complexity of the transformation agenda in South Africa makes the task of efficiently distributing and allocating resources difficult to achieve (Marwala, 2005c).
The other characteristic that has been observed in successful developmental states is economic nationalism. This characteristic is also observed in developed states such as the USA during tough economic times. The characteristic of the national question in South Africa, which makes the notion of "South Africaness" a highly complex concept given the vast diversity of the South African population, makes economic nationalism not a viable option in South Africa.
The other characteristic of a developmental state is its emphasis on market share over profit. The developed segment of the South African capitalist system is sophisticated and it has a huge component of short term investments also known as "hot money". This makes profit, particularly short term profit, a significant factor in the investment decision making process.
Developmental states have been observed for their protection of their embryonic domestic industries and have also been observed to focus on aggressive acquisition of foreign technology. This they achieve by deploying their most talented students to overseas universities located in strategic and major centres of the innovation world and also by effectively utilizing their foreign missions (Marwala, 2005c; Marwala, 2006).
Furthermore, they encourage and reward foreign companies that invest in building productive capacity such as manufacturing plants with the aim that the local industrial sector will in time be able to learn vital success factors from these companies. On constructing a harmonious social-industrial complex, developmental states strike a strategic alliance between the state, labour and industry in order to increase critical measures such as productivity, job security and industrial expansion. Even though developmental states do not create enemies unnecessarily and do not participate in the unnecessary criticism of countries with strategic technologies that they would like to acquire, they are, however, skeptical of copying foreign values without translating and infusing them with local characteristics.
Developmental states generally believe that they will attain state legitimacy through delivery of services to citizens rather than through the ballot. In South Africa, state legitimacy is achieved through the ballot however the main shortcoming is that the society has not reached an equilibrium stage where the feedback mechanism between voting pattern and service delivering reinforce each other. Now that the characteristics of a developmental state have been highlighted it is important to briefly describe industrialisation because it is an important component of a developmental state.
The vital driver for success in developmental states is industrialisation. The goal of industrialisation is to create a country that produces goods and services with high added values. For example, instead of exporting minerals unprocessed, people can be employed to beneficiate these minerals and manufacture goods such as watches and thus add economic value to the final products. The process by which countries add aggregate economic values to the products and services they offer is directly dependant on the level of industrialisation in the country's economy.
Keys to success -- Education, scientific and technological development, e.g. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
pluralism
Literally, a belief in more than one entity or a tendency to be, hold, or do more than one thing. This literal meaning is common to all the political and social applications of the word, but it has applied in contexts so varied that the uses seem like separate meanings. The most established of these is pluralism as the tendency of people to hold more than one job or benefice, most specifically in the context of the pre-Reformation Catholic Church. In the late nineteenth century, pluralism was applied to philosophical theories or systems of thought which recognized more than one ultimate principle, as opposed to those which were 'monist'. At the same time, the word came to be applied in the United States to the view that the country could legitimately continue to be formed of distinct ethnic groups, the Jewish-Americans, Irish-Americans, and so on, rather than that all differences should dissolve into a 'melting-pot' (see also multiculturalism).
All of these uses have had at least a slight influence on the primary contemporary meaning in which the pluralist model of society is one in which the existence of groups is the political essence of society. Pluralists in this sense contrast with elitists because they see the membership of village and neighbourhood communities, trade unions, voluntary societies, churches, and similar organizations as being more important than distinctions between a ruling class and a class that is ruled: vertical distinctions in society are less important than horizontal.
The forerunner of this kind of pluralism was F. R. de Lammenais who edited the journal L'Avenir in France in the early nineteenth century. Lammenais attacked both the individualism and the universalism of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The individual, he said, was 'a mere shadow', who could not be said to exist at all socially except in so far as he was part of one or more groups. Both Lammenais and modern pluralists, including such notable American writers as Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, tend to believe both that society consists essentially of groups, with its political life a competition for group influence, and that this state of affairs is a good thing. Thus pluralism is often a relatively conservative doctrine, at least in relation to Marxism or radical democratic theory, which both tend to portray society as a predominance of an elite over a non-elite rather than a competition between groups
Lincoln Allison
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Gale Encyclopedia of US Foreign Policy:
Elitism
Classical and New Elite Theory
Although the idea probably always has been present in some form, elitism emerged as a recognizable and clearly defined part of Western political thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The leading contributors to the theory were Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels. These writers attacked classical democratic thought and also Aristotle and Karl Marx. Majority rule, they insisted, is impossible. Every society is divided into those who rule and those who are ruled; and the rulers constitute only a small minority of any society. Aristotle's classification, which divided political systems into three types (rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by the many), does not fit reality either, for no man is capable of ruling by himself, and the many, too, lack the ability to govern. It is the few, under any political system, who exercise effective control. And Marx, with his emphasis on a class struggle that in the end (following the victory of the working class) leads to social harmony in a classless society, was also wrong. History features a continuing struggle among elites. That struggle will never end, and a classless society cannot be created. Moreover, to the pioneers in the development of elitist theory, Marx placed too much emphasis on economics and not enough on politics, which could be autonomous.
Classical elitist theory did not maintain merely that the active, socially recognizable people in a country made its important decisions—whether from within offices of government, from somewhere behind the scenes, or from completely outside the state apparatus. It emphatically asserted that the common man, however numerous within a society in absolute or relative terms, did not. Analysts of elites, who generally focus on the distribution of power rather than on the allocation of values, or on property and other wealth forms, differ somewhat over the degree of participation in government or, more generally, the political process that is necessary for a member of the elite accurately to be judged a member of what Mosca characterizes as "the ruling class." A society's elite is usually thought to be a stable entity, self-sustaining and constant over time. Yet the actual group that is in office can change markedly and very quickly. The concept of an elite therefore may need to be understood as encompassing all those who might govern as well as those who in fact do govern.
However "elite" is precisely understood, elitist theory is clear in the basic point that a minority, rather than the masses, controls things. The general population of a country—the common man—is ineffective. Even in societies with elections and other democratic mechanisms, it is posited, the ruling elite functions in a way that is largely independent of control by a popular majority. However, it made need a justifying doctrine. That the elite ordinarily functions according to a "political formula," in Mosca's term, is what makes its rule effective and acceptable to the masses. Thus, in theory, there can be a democratic elitism, however paradoxical that may seem.
A "new elite paradigm," building on the work of Mosca and other classical theorists, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s among comparative political sociologists. It drew attention to the occurrence, and the important effects, of divisions that may arise within the elite of a society. Its central proposition, as stated by John Higley and Michael Burton (1989), is as follows: "A disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. A consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit."
In the United States, normally, internal and external conditions have favored consensual unity within the nation's elite. Of course, the American Revolution and, later, the Civil War, are the major exceptions to this generalization. During those periods, divisions ran so deep as to produce counter-elites. As the political sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr., and the political historian C. Vann Woodward have shown, the reconciliation between North and South that occurred following post–Civil War Reconstruction was in significant part a result of a complex bargain between the elites in formerly opposed geographical sections. After the late nineteenth century, issues of foreign policy have on occasion divided the American elite as well. A by-product of this has been a widening of participation in the national debate over foreign policy. That this amounts to a "democratization" of American foreign policymaking, however, is highly disputable.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
Corporatism
The central core of corporatism is the notion of a system of interest intermediation linking producer interests and the state, in which explicitly recognized interest organizations are incorporated into the policy-making process, both in terms of the negotiation of policy and of securing compliance from their members with the agreed policy. However, one of the characteristics of the debate in the social sciences from the mid-1970s onwards about corporatism was the failure of the participants to agree about the meaning of the term. There was agreement that the area being studied was that of relations between organized interests and the state. There was some agreement that the discussion was particularly concerned with interests that arose from the division of labour in society, and particularly attempts to reconcile conflicts between capital and labour. However, while some analysts insisted that corporatist arrangements had to be tripartite, involving the state, organized employers, and organized labour, others insisted that they could be bipartite between the state and one of the other 'social partners', or between the 'social partners' themselves. There was a measure of agreement that whereas conventional pressure groups made representations about the content of public policy, corporatism involved a mixture of representation and control. In return for being involved in the formulation of public policy, corporatist interest groups were expected to assist in its implementation. This was sometimes captured through the idea of 'intermediation' which some analysts saw as central to the idea of corporatism (A. Cawson), although others doubted whether intermediation was unique to corporatism and therefore could be regarded as its distinguishing feature.
Although the modern debate started in the mid-1970s, the idea of corporatism has a long history. Guilds or corporations were important institutions in mediaeval life, but attracted little attention from political theorists. Conscious reflection about the potential prescriptive value of corporatist arrangements really started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), Leo XIII tackled the problems of the poverty of the working classes, the development of trade unions, and the prevalent 'spirit of revolutionary change'. It was argued that class conflict was not inevitable, but that capital and labour were mutually dependent. Noting the general growth of associative action, Leo XIII argued that problems such as working conditions and health and safety could be dealt with by specially established organizations or boards, with the state sanctioning and protecting such arrangements. The object of proceeding in this way was 'in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State'. This concern with limiting direct state intervention, and finding alternative forms of state-sanctioned associative action, has remained a central theme of the corporatist debate. The association between corporatism and Catholic social theory has also remained a strong one.
After the First World War, the idea of corporatism was taken up by the radical right, in particular by Mussolini, who placed it at the centre of the fascist regime in Italy. As a consequence, corporatism suffered from guilt by association. It came to be regarded as a synonym for fascism and disappeared from most political discussion, although it survived in Spain and especially Portugal.
There was, nevertheless, an alternative liberal version of corporatism which was clearly distinct from the surviving remnants of authoritarian corporatism. Samuel Beer made use of the term in his Modern British Politics (1965), forecasting that 'The further development of corporatism is surely to be expected'. Andrew Shonfield's Modern Capitalism, published in the same year and one of the most influential mid-century works on political economy, discussed the concept in terms of a corporatist management of economic planning in which the main interest groups were brought together to conclude bargains about their future behaviour.
The index entry for 'corporatism' in Shonfield's book reads 'see also Fascism', and it was the objective of the new generation of neocorporatist writers, led by Philippe Schmitter, to strip corporatism of its fascist associations, and to reinvent the concept as a means of analysing observable changes in a number of Western democracies. In 1974, Schmitter published Still the Century of Corporatism?, the title referring to Mihail Manoilesco's 1934 prediction that, just as the nineteenth century was that of liberalism, the twentieth century would be that of corporatism. Schmitter wished to escape from what he saw as an unhelpful dominance of pluralist analysis in American political science.
Schmitter triggered off an academic 'growth industry' on corporatism. In part, this was because it helped the understanding of long-term political phenomena such as the social pacts in Sweden and Switzerland, or the Parity Commission in Austria. Corporatism's appeal was wider, however, than explaining the politics of some of the more prosperous smaller European democracies where it was always difficult to decide whether corporatism promoted prosperity, or prosperity made corporatism possible because everyone came away from the bargaining table with something. Modern neocorporatism can best be understood as part of the breakdown of neo-Keynesianism. In the post-war period, Western governments had attempted to maintain full employment through techniques of aggregate demand management. This had, however, led to inflationary pressures, which became much worse after the first oil shock in 1973. Hence, governments increasingly turned to incomes policies as a means of restraining inflation while maintaining a demand management policy. This inevitably led them into agreements with the large producer groups, even in countries like Britain which had a predisposition for liberal solutions to economic problems. In particular, the unions were often offered concessions on social issues (employment law, taxation, social benefits) in return for agreeing to assist in the restraint of wage increases. The organized employers were also brought into the bargaining picture, in part because their assistance might be required in relation to price restraint, but also to act as a counterweight to the unions. The link between incomes policy and corporatism is illustrated in a study by Helander of the development of incomes policy in Finland which required the creation of new institutions and alterations in the functions of some existing ones. The Finnish political system changed into a two-tier one with parliamentary and corporatist subsystems
Although the debate on corporatism produced a considerable volume of research output, it is often regarded as flawed for a number of reasons. First, there was the failure to agree on what was actually being discussed. Second, although corporatism claimed to be distinctive from pluralism, it shared many of pluralism's assumptions, and could be presented by its opponents as little more than a subtype of pluralism. Third, the debate really developed just as the phenomena it was examining became less central to the political process. More liberal solutions to problems of economic policy became favoured in a number of European countries in the 1980s as social democratic parties lost power. Moreover the focus of debate moved away from the politics of production to the politics of collective consumption, as issues such as environmental problems moved higher up the political agenda. They are less amenable to corporatist solutions, and the relevance of a modernist concept like corporatism to more post-modernist forms of politics is open to question. Fourth, the debate was characterized by a failure to separate analysis and prescription. Many, although not all, of the writers on corporatism were either openly (C. Crouch) or covertly sympathetic to its use as a means of providing a 'middle way' that would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of organized labour whilst maintaining a capitalist mode of production. Corporatism was often defended in terms of its effectiveness in securing desired economic goals (high growth, low inflation, low unemployment), but there was a recognition that it could have undesirable political consequences. It lacked legitimacy as a mode of governance, emphasizing functional rather than territorial representation. It tended to bypass legislatures by creating new unelected bodies, such as economic councils of various kinds, and while it included some interests, it excluded others (smaller businesses, consumers). Fifth, as the debate developed in the 1980s, it focused increasingly on examples of sectoral or meso corporatism rather than at the macro level. Although many examples of corporatism were uncovered in particular policy areas (such as training policy and in many areas of agricultural policy), the explanatory value of corporatism as a model of the polity as a whole was thereby diminished.
Schmitter's article made a clear distinction between societal corporatism to be found in countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and state corporatism to be found in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Mexico, as well as Fascist Italy and Pétinist France. Much of the subsequent debate focused on societal (or 'liberal') corporatism, although Coleman showed that the concept of state corporatism could be applied in a liberal democracy through his analysis of Quebec.
The concept of corporatism has been applied to the European Community, which certainly has been influenced by the Catholic tradition of 'social partnership', exemplified by the 'val Duchesse' discussions between the Community, employers, and labour initiated in 1985. The protocol on social policy in the Maastricht treaty includes provisions both for consultation with management and labour, and arrangements for the joint implementation of directives by management and labour. This is an unambiguously corporatist arrangement, but if the Community had generally followed a corporatist path, the Economic and Social Committee would have been a central institution, instead of being marginalized.
The corporatist debate stimulated comparative empirical research on pressure groups as, for example, in the Organization of Business interests project co-ordinated by Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck. Whether it provided theoretical 'value added' beyond the insights provided by pluralism remains contentious.
Wyn Grant
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Review
Good governance ， but what are the values and perspectives？
自由、民主、尊重人權、公義、法治、問責性、回應性、公共利益（自由主義、功利主義、正義論、社群主義）
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Governance models
Laissez faire state 自由放任型政府
Neo-classical model 新古典模型
Keynesian model 凱恩斯模型
Welfare state 福利國家型
The third way 第三條路模式
Developmental state 發展型國家
Plural state 多元主義模式
Elitist state 精英主義模式
Corporatist state 統合主義\ 社團主義模式
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Laissez-faire
Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
'Laissez-faire' means 'leave to do'; a more colloquial translation might be 'let them get on with it'. Since the late eighteenth century such phrases as 'a laissez-faire policy' and 'laissez-faire economics' have suggested a belief in the virtues of allowing individuals to pursue their interests through market transactions with minimal government interference.
However, laissez-faire in a broad sense, as opposed to the use of the phrase in particular contexts with respect to particular sections of production, is vague and its historical location elusive. Laissez-faire economics is not normally based on libertarian ethics but rather on the utilitarian calculation that absence of interference functions better than interference. But nearly all market theories are also theories of market failure and it is difficult to identify any leading economic thinker who thought that laissez-faire was the best solution to all problems. Adam Smith, for example, did not believe that unregulated markets could provide the kind of educational system which a commercial society needed.
— Lincoln Allison
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Oxford Dictionary of British History:
Laissez-faire
The transition from the medieval to the modern economy was characterized by the progressive removal of restrictions on individuals and groups in favour of the operation of market forces. The balance between complete un-restriction and some control is still strenuously debated. In reality the state of complete laissez-faire has never existed. John Stuart Mill defined what has become accepted as the minimum level of state intervention. Amongst such interventions for the greater good, he included the power to enforce contracts and secure property rights, the administration of justice, the right to tax in order to provide public goods such as transport systems, sanitation and public health, and state-supported education.
While the notion of laissez-faire is usually associated with the decline of the medieval and mercantilist economic regimes, it has an enduring modern counterpart in the views of the neoclassical and new classical economists, who may use different terminology, but whose essential view is that individual freedom to function within un-trammeled markets, with little involvement from government, represents the best type of economic organization. All these strands of thought assert the right of the individual and depict state involvement in the economy as ineffectual or malign.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
Keynesian model --
J M Keynes, (1883-1946) British economist, who made a leading contribution to economic theory, particularly through The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), to economic policy, and to international economic negotiations. The use of the word 'Keynesian' to describe a particular mix of economic and social policy is a reflection of the success of his attempt to provide an intellectual justification for a form of government intervention that would save capitalism and liberal democracy, a task which appeared to be a compelling and urgent one in the 1930s. In a chapter entitled 'Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might Lead', Keynes admits that his theory is moderately conservative in its implications. The state would intervene in some areas, including the use of the tax system to influence the propensity to consume, but wide fields of activity would be unaffected. A comprehensive socialization of investment would be necessary to achieve full employment, but this could be achieved by what would later be called public-private partnerships. There was no obvious case for a comprehensive system of state socialism, and most of the necessary measures could be introduced gradually, and without a general break in the traditions of society.
Keynes was a product of an essentially Victorian milieu which had set aside religious belief, but maintained a strong interest in moral rules of conduct, underpinned by rational justification rather than faith in the existence of a deity. From Eton he went to King's College where he graduated in mathematics and then spent a fourth year reading economics, then dominated by Alfred Marshall and his Principles of Economics. While at Cambridge, Keynes wrote a long prize essay on Burke which gives a good indication of Keynes's developing political beliefs. He emphasized Burke's advocacy of expediency against abstract rights, and, like Burke, he was uncertain about the value of basing action on absolute principles. Keynes supported Burke's view that war should be approached with prudence, and in the First World War he attempted to register as a conscientious objector, but was exempted because of his work at the Treasury. 1919 he published a critique of the Versailles settlement entitled The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which achieved substantial worldwide sales and had a considerable influence on political opinion. Keynes argued that the Versailles settlement would impoverish Europe.
In the early 1920s, Keynes became involved with the Liberal Party. 1926 he became a member of a Liberal Industrial Inquiry, drafting substantial parts of the report on Britain's Industrial Future, better known as the Yellow Book. One of the proposals was that the investment funds of all public concerns should be put into a separate capital budget under the direction of a national investment board. The disappointing performance of the Liberals in 1929, and their reactions to the depression, lessened his enthusiasm for the party. He gave some financial support to individual Labour candidates in the 1930s, and made some favourable comments about Labour policies. When he became a peer 1942 he sat as an independent, although he continued to express some sympathy for the Liberals and gave them a small donation in 1945. As one of Keynes's biographers, Robert Skidelsky, has pointed out, Keynes was a political economist rather than a political animal, someone who was interested in influencing public policy, but who believed that the intellectual argument had to be won before the political argument. Although Keynes wrote extensively for the popular press in the middle period of his life, he was of a generation that believed that rational decision-making could be left to a well-informed elite based in London and the ancient universities. Keynes had the economist's habit of referring to political difficulties as second-order problems for which economists had no professional responsibility to provide solutions. He recognized that full employment could lead to upward pressures on wages, a problem which eventually led economists working in the Keynesian tradition to advocate incomes policies. He argued that the task of keeping wages reasonably stable was a 'political rather than an economic problem', and that the combination of collective bargaining and full employment was an 'essentially political problem' where analytical methods were of little assistance. His involvement in important economic negotiations with the Americans during and immediately after the Second World War showed that he had good negotiating skills, and an awareness of political realities and the need for mutual accommodation. Keynes's advocacy of macroecomic economic management did not provide an enduring solution to the problem of maintaining full employment, even less that of curbing inflation, but no discussion of the politics of economic management in the latter half of the twentieth century can proceed very far without reference to Keynes and his influential, if often ambiguous, ideas.
Wyn Grant
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Investopedia
Neo-classical Model --
An approach to economics that relates supply and demand to an individual's rationality and his or her ability to maximize utility or profit. Neoclassical economics also increased the use of mathematical equations in the study of various aspects of the economy. This approach was developed in the late-nineteenth century, based on books by William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras.
Since its inception, neoclassical economics has grown to become the primary take on modern-day economics. Although it is now the most widely taught form of economics, this school of thought still has its detractors. Most criticism points out that neoclassical economics makes many unfounded and unrealistic assumptions that do not represent real situations. For example, the assumption that all parties will behave rationally overlooks the fact that human nature is vulnerable to other forces, which cause people to make irrational choices. Therefore, many critics believe that this approach cannot be used to describe actual economies.
Neoclassical economics is also sometimes blamed for inequalities in global debt and trade relations because the theory holds that such matters as labor rights will improve naturally, as a result of economic conditions
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Welfare state
[Oxford dictionary of politics]
A system in which the government undertakes the main responsibility for providing for the social and economic security of the state's population by means of pensions, social security benefits, free health care, and so forth. 1942 the Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom proposed a far-reaching 'settlement', as part of a wider social and economic reconstruction, once victory in the Second World War was secured, and became the blueprint for the British welfare state.
By 1944 a White Paper made full employment the first goal of government economic policy, and the Butler Act provided for universal secondary education. Labour, however, won the 1945 general election, to a considerable extent because they appeared more wholeheartedly in favour of the Beveridge plan. The key measures which followed, largely implementing the plan's essential features, were the National Insurance Act 1946, the National Health Service Act 1946, and the National Assistance Act 1948. An ambitious programme to build a million homes was also launched. By 1948 The Times newspaper proclaimed in an editorial that these measures had created 'security from the cradle to the grave' for every citizen.
These measures were the foundation of the 'welfare state', which was seen as synonymous with 'social security'. In a specific sense this meant entitlements to benefits under the newly established national insurance and assistance schemes. In a wider sense it referred to the other reforms implemented at the time, particularly the guarantees of full employment and access to a national health service free at the point of use. Underlying all this, however, was a new conception of the relationship between the state and the individual within a market-based society. This was based on an acceptance of the need for extensive intervention to ensure that its worst effects were mitigated, on the grounds that their causes were systemic rather than the fault or responsibility of individuals.
Nevertheless, behind the apparent consensus on the need for a welfare state, there was political conflict on its meaning between 'reluctant collectivists' in the liberal tradition (such as Beveridge himself) who saw the reforms of the 1940s as a high-water mark, and reformist socialists who saw it as a framework for developing a more concerted shift towards a planned and egalitarian society. A small minority of commentators, such as Hayek, were never convinced of the need for the welfare state in the first place and remained resolutely 'anti-collectivist'.
The growing 'crisis' of the welfare state since the 1970s can be seen as due to changed economic and social circumstances, a disintegration of the post-war consensus, or both of these. Undoubtedly, growing economic pressures were making it harder to meet more insistent demands for improved services, and increased social needs due to changes in family patterns, more older people, and growing numbers of unemployed people. On the other hand, the 'welfare state' had been increasingly criticized within a more polarized political culture. Critics from the right argued that by removing responsibility from the individual, the welfare state stifled people's initiative to solve their own problems. Critics from the left agreed in part that the welfare state as it currently stood was often 'oppressive', but attributed this to a failure to attack the root causes of class, gender, and 'race' inequalities.
Even before 1979 there were discernible shifts by the 1974-9 Labour government after the expenditure crisis of 1976 towards retrenchment and 'restructuring' of welfare in ways that responded most to right-wing rather than left-wing critics. However, after the Conservative election victory of 1979, this shift occurred in a more concerted way and there have been substantial reforms in all of the services established as a result of the Beveridge Report, though only in one, housing, could there be said to have been significant retrenchment in provision. In other areas, there have been a tightening of eligibility rules and shifts to decentralization of managerial responsibility within tighter centralized control of finance. Perhaps most controversial of all has been the reform of the National Health Service in 1990, against widespread opposition, to create an 'internal' market within a socialized system.
In a wider sense, there has been a significant shift from Beveridge's assumptions. Most importantly, there was a shift in economic priorities from maintaining full employment to controlling inflation. The modest redistribution of income and wealth achieved up to the 1970s, was reversed by cuts in income tax and a shift to more regressive forms of indirect taxation like value added tax (VAT). Despite all this, by the end of the 1980s the welfare state had been 'restructured' rather than abolished. It was suggested that a new 'welfare pluralist' consensus had emerged in which it was accepted that private, state, and voluntary sectors could exist side by side. In the 1990s the growing internationalization of the global economy, which has undermined the autonomy of national governments, led to pressure to reduce wage and social security costs in order to attract highly mobile investment.
It is probably most helpful to situate the British variant analytically and comparatively as a 'welfare state regime'. These, G. Esping-Anderson argues in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, fall into three main types within market societies: 'conservative', 'social democratic', and 'liberal', depending on the extent to which they seek to work with, or to counter the effects of, the market on social inequalities. An example of a conservative regime is Germany, characterized by high welfare provision within a hierarchical and ordered society, while Sweden is closest to an egalitarian 'social democratic' regime. Though 1948 the British welfare state was among the most developed, by the 1970s provision had become more extensive in conservative and social democratic regimes, and the British welfare state looked closest to the 'liberal' model, with only limited attempts to use welfare to mitigate social inequalities. Though all welfare state regimes have been under pressure, in Britain and the United States the shift towards liberalism has been particularly pronounced, nor was it reversed on Labour coming to power in 1997.
— Mick Carpenter
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
THE THIRD WAY
Generally, any ideology that claims that it lies in between two traditional approaches that the writer believes are too limited. Specifically, the ideology claimed to underlie the actions of New Labour in Britain after the succession of Tony Blair to the leadership of the Labour Party in 1994. In this case, the two old ways are often understood to be socialism and capitalism. However, both its main ideologue in the UK (Anthony Giddens) and Prime Minister Blair emphasize that it is supposed to be a modernized form of social democracy, rather than an alternative to it.
Although critics of the New Labour Third Way claim that it has no empirical content, its defenders see it as a route between what was seen as the excessive paternalism (and statism) of traditional left policies and the excessive individual personal responsibility of the right. The policy of welfare to work—dubbed 'tough love' by British thirdwayers—was an early example: a combination of a greater emphasis on personal responsibility to find work backed with the threat of withdrawal of benefits, but at the same time a reinforcing of a framework of public support. For a while in the late 1990s, the German Social Democratic Party imitated New Labour with a claim to pursue die neue Mitte, but that claim too disappeared in the 2000s. The concept has a modest salience in the USA where it has become central to the philosophy of the Democratic Leadership Council, the centrist pressure group in the Democrats. See also social exclusion; social market.
— Iain McLean
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Developmental State
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0907/0907.2019.pdf
A developmental state is a state where government is intimately involved in the macro and micro-economic planning in order to grow the economy (Onis, 1991). It has generally been observed that successful developmental states are able to advance their economies much faster than regulatory states that use regulations to manage the economy.
Characteristics of a Developmental State
In order to understand the concept of a developmental state, it is important to highlight some of the characteristics of a developmental state (Thompson, 1996; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Developmental states generally put strong emphasis on technical education and the development of numeracy and computer skills within the population. This technically oriented education is strategically used to capacitate government structures particularly the bureaucracy. What emerges out of this strategy is that the political and bureaucratic layers are populated by extremely educated people who have sufficient tools of analysis to be able to take leadership initiatives, based on sound scientific basis, at every level of decision making nodes within the government structure.
Developmental states have been observed to be able to efficiently distribute and allocate resources and, therefore, invest optimally in critical areas that are the basis of industrialisation such as education. The complexity of the transformation agenda in South Africa makes the task of efficiently distributing and allocating resources difficult to achieve (Marwala, 2005c).
The other characteristic that has been observed in successful developmental states is economic nationalism. This characteristic is also observed in developed states such as the USA during tough economic times. The characteristic of the national question in South Africa, which makes the notion of "South Africaness" a highly complex concept given the vast diversity of the South African population, makes economic nationalism not a viable option in South Africa.
The other characteristic of a developmental state is its emphasis on market share over profit. The developed segment of the South African capitalist system is sophisticated and it has a huge component of short term investments also known as "hot money". This makes profit, particularly short term profit, a significant factor in the investment decision making process.
Developmental states have been observed for their protection of their embryonic domestic industries and have also been observed to focus on aggressive acquisition of foreign technology. This they achieve by deploying their most talented students to overseas universities located in strategic and major centres of the innovation world and also by effectively utilizing their foreign missions (Marwala, 2005c; Marwala, 2006).
Furthermore, they encourage and reward foreign companies that invest in building productive capacity such as manufacturing plants with the aim that the local industrial sector will in time be able to learn vital success factors from these companies. On constructing a harmonious social-industrial complex, developmental states strike a strategic alliance between the state, labour and industry in order to increase critical measures such as productivity, job security and industrial expansion. Even though developmental states do not create enemies unnecessarily and do not participate in the unnecessary criticism of countries with strategic technologies that they would like to acquire, they are, however, skeptical of copying foreign values without translating and infusing them with local characteristics.
Developmental states generally believe that they will attain state legitimacy through delivery of services to citizens rather than through the ballot. In South Africa, state legitimacy is achieved through the ballot however the main shortcoming is that the society has not reached an equilibrium stage where the feedback mechanism between voting pattern and service delivering reinforce each other. Now that the characteristics of a developmental state have been highlighted it is important to briefly describe industrialisation because it is an important component of a developmental state.
The vital driver for success in developmental states is industrialisation. The goal of industrialisation is to create a country that produces goods and services with high added values. For example, instead of exporting minerals unprocessed, people can be employed to beneficiate these minerals and manufacture goods such as watches and thus add economic value to the final products. The process by which countries add aggregate economic values to the products and services they offer is directly dependant on the level of industrialisation in the country's economy.
Keys to success -- Education, scientific and technological development, e.g. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
pluralism
Literally, a belief in more than one entity or a tendency to be, hold, or do more than one thing. This literal meaning is common to all the political and social applications of the word, but it has applied in contexts so varied that the uses seem like separate meanings. The most established of these is pluralism as the tendency of people to hold more than one job or benefice, most specifically in the context of the pre-Reformation Catholic Church. In the late nineteenth century, pluralism was applied to philosophical theories or systems of thought which recognized more than one ultimate principle, as opposed to those which were 'monist'. At the same time, the word came to be applied in the United States to the view that the country could legitimately continue to be formed of distinct ethnic groups, the Jewish-Americans, Irish-Americans, and so on, rather than that all differences should dissolve into a 'melting-pot' (see also multiculturalism).
All of these uses have had at least a slight influence on the primary contemporary meaning in which the pluralist model of society is one in which the existence of groups is the political essence of society. Pluralists in this sense contrast with elitists because they see the membership of village and neighbourhood communities, trade unions, voluntary societies, churches, and similar organizations as being more important than distinctions between a ruling class and a class that is ruled: vertical distinctions in society are less important than horizontal.
The forerunner of this kind of pluralism was F. R. de Lammenais who edited the journal L'Avenir in France in the early nineteenth century. Lammenais attacked both the individualism and the universalism of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The individual, he said, was 'a mere shadow', who could not be said to exist at all socially except in so far as he was part of one or more groups. Both Lammenais and modern pluralists, including such notable American writers as Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, tend to believe both that society consists essentially of groups, with its political life a competition for group influence, and that this state of affairs is a good thing. Thus pluralism is often a relatively conservative doctrine, at least in relation to Marxism or radical democratic theory, which both tend to portray society as a predominance of an elite over a non-elite rather than a competition between groups
Lincoln Allison
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Gale Encyclopedia of US Foreign Policy:
Elitism
Classical and New Elite Theory
Although the idea probably always has been present in some form, elitism emerged as a recognizable and clearly defined part of Western political thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The leading contributors to the theory were Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels. These writers attacked classical democratic thought and also Aristotle and Karl Marx. Majority rule, they insisted, is impossible. Every society is divided into those who rule and those who are ruled; and the rulers constitute only a small minority of any society. Aristotle's classification, which divided political systems into three types (rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by the many), does not fit reality either, for no man is capable of ruling by himself, and the many, too, lack the ability to govern. It is the few, under any political system, who exercise effective control. And Marx, with his emphasis on a class struggle that in the end (following the victory of the working class) leads to social harmony in a classless society, was also wrong. History features a continuing struggle among elites. That struggle will never end, and a classless society cannot be created. Moreover, to the pioneers in the development of elitist theory, Marx placed too much emphasis on economics and not enough on politics, which could be autonomous.
Classical elitist theory did not maintain merely that the active, socially recognizable people in a country made its important decisions—whether from within offices of government, from somewhere behind the scenes, or from completely outside the state apparatus. It emphatically asserted that the common man, however numerous within a society in absolute or relative terms, did not. Analysts of elites, who generally focus on the distribution of power rather than on the allocation of values, or on property and other wealth forms, differ somewhat over the degree of participation in government or, more generally, the political process that is necessary for a member of the elite accurately to be judged a member of what Mosca characterizes as "the ruling class." A society's elite is usually thought to be a stable entity, self-sustaining and constant over time. Yet the actual group that is in office can change markedly and very quickly. The concept of an elite therefore may need to be understood as encompassing all those who might govern as well as those who in fact do govern.
However "elite" is precisely understood, elitist theory is clear in the basic point that a minority, rather than the masses, controls things. The general population of a country—the common man—is ineffective. Even in societies with elections and other democratic mechanisms, it is posited, the ruling elite functions in a way that is largely independent of control by a popular majority. However, it made need a justifying doctrine. That the elite ordinarily functions according to a "political formula," in Mosca's term, is what makes its rule effective and acceptable to the masses. Thus, in theory, there can be a democratic elitism, however paradoxical that may seem.
A "new elite paradigm," building on the work of Mosca and other classical theorists, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s among comparative political sociologists. It drew attention to the occurrence, and the important effects, of divisions that may arise within the elite of a society. Its central proposition, as stated by John Higley and Michael Burton (1989), is as follows: "A disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. A consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit."
In the United States, normally, internal and external conditions have favored consensual unity within the nation's elite. Of course, the American Revolution and, later, the Civil War, are the major exceptions to this generalization. During those periods, divisions ran so deep as to produce counter-elites. As the political sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr., and the political historian C. Vann Woodward have shown, the reconciliation between North and South that occurred following post–Civil War Reconstruction was in significant part a result of a complex bargain between the elites in formerly opposed geographical sections. After the late nineteenth century, issues of foreign policy have on occasion divided the American elite as well. A by-product of this has been a widening of participation in the national debate over foreign policy. That this amounts to a "democratization" of American foreign policymaking, however, is highly disputable.
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
Corporatism
The central core of corporatism is the notion of a system of interest intermediation linking producer interests and the state, in which explicitly recognized interest organizations are incorporated into the policy-making process, both in terms of the negotiation of policy and of securing compliance from their members with the agreed policy. However, one of the characteristics of the debate in the social sciences from the mid-1970s onwards about corporatism was the failure of the participants to agree about the meaning of the term. There was agreement that the area being studied was that of relations between organized interests and the state. There was some agreement that the discussion was particularly concerned with interests that arose from the division of labour in society, and particularly attempts to reconcile conflicts between capital and labour. However, while some analysts insisted that corporatist arrangements had to be tripartite, involving the state, organized employers, and organized labour, others insisted that they could be bipartite between the state and one of the other 'social partners', or between the 'social partners' themselves. There was a measure of agreement that whereas conventional pressure groups made representations about the content of public policy, corporatism involved a mixture of representation and control. In return for being involved in the formulation of public policy, corporatist interest groups were expected to assist in its implementation. This was sometimes captured through the idea of 'intermediation' which some analysts saw as central to the idea of corporatism (A. Cawson), although others doubted whether intermediation was unique to corporatism and therefore could be regarded as its distinguishing feature.
Although the modern debate started in the mid-1970s, the idea of corporatism has a long history. Guilds or corporations were important institutions in mediaeval life, but attracted little attention from political theorists. Conscious reflection about the potential prescriptive value of corporatist arrangements really started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), Leo XIII tackled the problems of the poverty of the working classes, the development of trade unions, and the prevalent 'spirit of revolutionary change'. It was argued that class conflict was not inevitable, but that capital and labour were mutually dependent. Noting the general growth of associative action, Leo XIII argued that problems such as working conditions and health and safety could be dealt with by specially established organizations or boards, with the state sanctioning and protecting such arrangements. The object of proceeding in this way was 'in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State'. This concern with limiting direct state intervention, and finding alternative forms of state-sanctioned associative action, has remained a central theme of the corporatist debate. The association between corporatism and Catholic social theory has also remained a strong one.
After the First World War, the idea of corporatism was taken up by the radical right, in particular by Mussolini, who placed it at the centre of the fascist regime in Italy. As a consequence, corporatism suffered from guilt by association. It came to be regarded as a synonym for fascism and disappeared from most political discussion, although it survived in Spain and especially Portugal.
There was, nevertheless, an alternative liberal version of corporatism which was clearly distinct from the surviving remnants of authoritarian corporatism. Samuel Beer made use of the term in his Modern British Politics (1965), forecasting that 'The further development of corporatism is surely to be expected'. Andrew Shonfield's Modern Capitalism, published in the same year and one of the most influential mid-century works on political economy, discussed the concept in terms of a corporatist management of economic planning in which the main interest groups were brought together to conclude bargains about their future behaviour.
The index entry for 'corporatism' in Shonfield's book reads 'see also Fascism', and it was the objective of the new generation of neocorporatist writers, led by Philippe Schmitter, to strip corporatism of its fascist associations, and to reinvent the concept as a means of analysing observable changes in a number of Western democracies. In 1974, Schmitter published Still the Century of Corporatism?, the title referring to Mihail Manoilesco's 1934 prediction that, just as the nineteenth century was that of liberalism, the twentieth century would be that of corporatism. Schmitter wished to escape from what he saw as an unhelpful dominance of pluralist analysis in American political science.
Schmitter triggered off an academic 'growth industry' on corporatism. In part, this was because it helped the understanding of long-term political phenomena such as the social pacts in Sweden and Switzerland, or the Parity Commission in Austria. Corporatism's appeal was wider, however, than explaining the politics of some of the more prosperous smaller European democracies where it was always difficult to decide whether corporatism promoted prosperity, or prosperity made corporatism possible because everyone came away from the bargaining table with something. Modern neocorporatism can best be understood as part of the breakdown of neo-Keynesianism. In the post-war period, Western governments had attempted to maintain full employment through techniques of aggregate demand management. This had, however, led to inflationary pressures, which became much worse after the first oil shock in 1973. Hence, governments increasingly turned to incomes policies as a means of restraining inflation while maintaining a demand management policy. This inevitably led them into agreements with the large producer groups, even in countries like Britain which had a predisposition for liberal solutions to economic problems. In particular, the unions were often offered concessions on social issues (employment law, taxation, social benefits) in return for agreeing to assist in the restraint of wage increases. The organized employers were also brought into the bargaining picture, in part because their assistance might be required in relation to price restraint, but also to act as a counterweight to the unions. The link between incomes policy and corporatism is illustrated in a study by Helander of the development of incomes policy in Finland which required the creation of new institutions and alterations in the functions of some existing ones. The Finnish political system changed into a two-tier one with parliamentary and corporatist subsystems
Although the debate on corporatism produced a considerable volume of research output, it is often regarded as flawed for a number of reasons. First, there was the failure to agree on what was actually being discussed. Second, although corporatism claimed to be distinctive from pluralism, it shared many of pluralism's assumptions, and could be presented by its opponents as little more than a subtype of pluralism. Third, the debate really developed just as the phenomena it was examining became less central to the political process. More liberal solutions to problems of economic policy became favoured in a number of European countries in the 1980s as social democratic parties lost power. Moreover the focus of debate moved away from the politics of production to the politics of collective consumption, as issues such as environmental problems moved higher up the political agenda. They are less amenable to corporatist solutions, and the relevance of a modernist concept like corporatism to more post-modernist forms of politics is open to question. Fourth, the debate was characterized by a failure to separate analysis and prescription. Many, although not all, of the writers on corporatism were either openly (C. Crouch) or covertly sympathetic to its use as a means of providing a 'middle way' that would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of organized labour whilst maintaining a capitalist mode of production. Corporatism was often defended in terms of its effectiveness in securing desired economic goals (high growth, low inflation, low unemployment), but there was a recognition that it could have undesirable political consequences. It lacked legitimacy as a mode of governance, emphasizing functional rather than territorial representation. It tended to bypass legislatures by creating new unelected bodies, such as economic councils of various kinds, and while it included some interests, it excluded others (smaller businesses, consumers). Fifth, as the debate developed in the 1980s, it focused increasingly on examples of sectoral or meso corporatism rather than at the macro level. Although many examples of corporatism were uncovered in particular policy areas (such as training policy and in many areas of agricultural policy), the explanatory value of corporatism as a model of the polity as a whole was thereby diminished.
Schmitter's article made a clear distinction between societal corporatism to be found in countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and state corporatism to be found in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Mexico, as well as Fascist Italy and Pétinist France. Much of the subsequent debate focused on societal (or 'liberal') corporatism, although Coleman showed that the concept of state corporatism could be applied in a liberal democracy through his analysis of Quebec.
The concept of corporatism has been applied to the European Community, which certainly has been influenced by the Catholic tradition of 'social partnership', exemplified by the 'val Duchesse' discussions between the Community, employers, and labour initiated in 1985. The protocol on social policy in the Maastricht treaty includes provisions both for consultation with management and labour, and arrangements for the joint implementation of directives by management and labour. This is an unambiguously corporatist arrangement, but if the Community had generally followed a corporatist path, the Economic and Social Committee would have been a central institution, instead of being marginalized.
The corporatist debate stimulated comparative empirical research on pressure groups as, for example, in the Organization of Business interests project co-ordinated by Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck. Whether it provided theoretical 'value added' beyond the insights provided by pluralism remains contentious.
Wyn Grant
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2012年9月10日星期一
2012年9月9日星期日
Fwd: Week 3 stpa, 10-9-2012, dr sunny chan
Week 3 stpa, 10-9-2012, dr sunny chan
Group work, (2~3 students as a group,)
嘗試瞭解近日澳門廉政公署及審計署對於運輸基建辦公室涉嫌行政失當之兩份調查報告，以 1000~2000 字，握要說明其論點，並提出您的分析或見解, 須運用公共行政學之理論或概念。
Deadline : week 5, Monday.
另外，同學們亦有機會在堂上作口頭報告或與教授互動討論此題目。
## 注意：本功課之目的是希望學員能夠反思什麼是「善治」？政府在制定具體政策的過程中，有什麼原則必須遵守？
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善治：
@ 合法性、認受性，legitimacy ，社會大多數人之政治認同感。
@ 政策透明性、公開化，transparency ，讓公民有機會參與公共決策過程，監督政府工作。
@ 問責性，accountability ，各政府部門及官員權責清晰，如有任何行政失當，立刻可以找出誰人或那個部門須要負責，或受到譴責。
@ 法治原則，rule of law ，任何人以及政府，都在法律以下，都必須依法行事。法令穩定。
@ 回應性，responsiveness，政府部門或官員，必須對公民的要求作出及時的反應。
@ 高效率，efficiency ，節省資源，最少投入，獲得最大產出。
@ 高效能，effectiveness ，最大程度達致預期目的。
@ 公共參與政策制定過程，民主化，democratic 。
@ 良好職效管理，performance measurement.
@ 政治穩定與暴力程度。
@ 貪污控制。
@ 制衡，check and balance. 權力分立，separation of powers.
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管治的理念系統\ 道德價值判斷之標準
自由主義
功利主義：興起於西方工業革命年代。新中產階級，爭取政治自由和公民權利。
Jeremy Bentham
Happiness as end-in-itself。
Moral rule ~ Maximization of utility。創造出有價值的事態。
Focus on states of affairs, not individual human beings.
Good Public policies aim at Good consequences ~ the greatest happiness of the greatest number, consequentialism 後果論。
all kinds of happiness are equal in value。
John Stuart Mill
Modified the perspective
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Happiness should be in a social and collective sense, public interests 公共利益，virtue 美德，(morality 道德觀）。
Human behaviors can be divided as two kinds :
Self-regarding behaviors - free.
Other-regarding behaviors - controlled by law.
當一個社會的基本制度及政策，能在該社會所有人中間產生最大的效益淨值（快樂、欲望獲得滿足），這情況便是合理及公正的。
只考慮整體效益的增加，欲不理會這些效益如何在公民之間進行分配；在某些情況下，個人基本自由和權利會被政府以整體利益之名而犧牲。
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社會正義論
對功利主義及右派自由主義的批評。
正義原則
1\ 每個人都有同等的權利，在與所有人同樣的自由體系相容的情況下，擁有最廣泛的平等的基本自由體系。
2\ 社會和經濟的不平等應這樣安排：
A/ 在和公正的儲蓄原則一致的前提下，對社會中最弱勢的人最為有利；
B/ 在公平的平等機的條件下，職位與工作向所有人開放。
在無知之幕下訂立契約。
人人生而平等。
反對功利主義，反對犧牲小部分人的利益。
平等主義，反對右派自由主義，反思天賦及家庭背景使社會貧富懸殊，機會不均等。
反對「至善主義」，否定人類有特定卓越目標。反對政府推動某種內在價值觀，意識形態洗腦。
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民粹主義
Populism - 人民不滿現狀，激進地反對統治階級壟斷經濟、政治、文化…
@ 主角：弱勢群體、農民、新移民、工人、教育水平低之人士、黑人、被邊緣化的人…
@ 反體制，但不一定會革命。二元對立化、妖魔化對立者。
帶有點非理性，激進之政治參與行動。
較少考慮長遠性、整體性利益。
@ 政客的民粹
@ 民粹主義式獨裁，例如，1940，阿根廷，貝隆。
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社群主義
反對個人主義，
主張集體、制度、人類關係等的存在及其重要性。
倫理之價值不在於個人。
強調，互惠、團結、信任、傳統美德…
發現倫理原則之方法是：嘗試詮釋與定義已存在於真實現存團體生活方式中的價值。
個人是屬於特定文化、傳統、社群下的自我。
自我認同- 受到社群價值觀所影響。
社群價值、傳統；但不是單一套正義原則。
Charles Taylor , 自我不可能與社群傳統文化脫離。
人是根屬於社群脈絡下而存在。
社群文化乃先於個人而存在，是構成自我認同的因素。
人際關係是處於對話的結構狀態。
Self identity and significant others, interaction and recognition.
愛國心及道德價值觀：是一種基於對社群共同歷史記憶，共同命運所自然產生之情感及價值觀。
會在成員參與社群事務中逐漸增強，形成集體認同。
\\\\\\\
Group work, (2~3 students as a group,)
嘗試瞭解近日澳門廉政公署及審計署對於運輸基建辦公室涉嫌行政失當之兩份調查報告，以 1000~2000 字，握要說明其論點，並提出您的分析或見解, 須運用公共行政學之理論或概念。
Deadline : week 5, Monday.
另外，同學們亦有機會在堂上作口頭報告或與教授互動討論此題目。
## 注意：本功課之目的是希望學員能夠反思什麼是「善治」？政府在制定具體政策的過程中，有什麼原則必須遵守？
\\\\\\\
善治：
@ 合法性、認受性，legitimacy ，社會大多數人之政治認同感。
@ 政策透明性、公開化，transparency ，讓公民有機會參與公共決策過程，監督政府工作。
@ 問責性，accountability ，各政府部門及官員權責清晰，如有任何行政失當，立刻可以找出誰人或那個部門須要負責，或受到譴責。
@ 法治原則，rule of law ，任何人以及政府，都在法律以下，都必須依法行事。法令穩定。
@ 回應性，responsiveness，政府部門或官員，必須對公民的要求作出及時的反應。
@ 高效率，efficiency ，節省資源，最少投入，獲得最大產出。
@ 高效能，effectiveness ，最大程度達致預期目的。
@ 公共參與政策制定過程，民主化，democratic 。
@ 良好職效管理，performance measurement.
@ 政治穩定與暴力程度。
@ 貪污控制。
@ 制衡，check and balance. 權力分立，separation of powers.
\\\\\\\
管治的理念系統\ 道德價值判斷之標準
自由主義
功利主義：興起於西方工業革命年代。新中產階級，爭取政治自由和公民權利。
Jeremy Bentham
Happiness as end-in-itself。
Moral rule ~ Maximization of utility。創造出有價值的事態。
Focus on states of affairs, not individual human beings.
Good Public policies aim at Good consequences ~ the greatest happiness of the greatest number, consequentialism 後果論。
all kinds of happiness are equal in value。
John Stuart Mill
Modified the perspective
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Happiness should be in a social and collective sense, public interests 公共利益，virtue 美德，(morality 道德觀）。
Human behaviors can be divided as two kinds :
Self-regarding behaviors - free.
Other-regarding behaviors - controlled by law.
當一個社會的基本制度及政策，能在該社會所有人中間產生最大的效益淨值（快樂、欲望獲得滿足），這情況便是合理及公正的。
只考慮整體效益的增加，欲不理會這些效益如何在公民之間進行分配；在某些情況下，個人基本自由和權利會被政府以整體利益之名而犧牲。
\\\\
社會正義論
對功利主義及右派自由主義的批評。
正義原則
1\ 每個人都有同等的權利，在與所有人同樣的自由體系相容的情況下，擁有最廣泛的平等的基本自由體系。
2\ 社會和經濟的不平等應這樣安排：
A/ 在和公正的儲蓄原則一致的前提下，對社會中最弱勢的人最為有利；
B/ 在公平的平等機的條件下，職位與工作向所有人開放。
在無知之幕下訂立契約。
人人生而平等。
反對功利主義，反對犧牲小部分人的利益。
平等主義，反對右派自由主義，反思天賦及家庭背景使社會貧富懸殊，機會不均等。
反對「至善主義」，否定人類有特定卓越目標。反對政府推動某種內在價值觀，意識形態洗腦。
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民粹主義
Populism - 人民不滿現狀，激進地反對統治階級壟斷經濟、政治、文化…
@ 主角：弱勢群體、農民、新移民、工人、教育水平低之人士、黑人、被邊緣化的人…
@ 反體制，但不一定會革命。二元對立化、妖魔化對立者。
帶有點非理性，激進之政治參與行動。
較少考慮長遠性、整體性利益。
@ 政客的民粹
@ 民粹主義式獨裁，例如，1940，阿根廷，貝隆。
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社群主義
反對個人主義，
主張集體、制度、人類關係等的存在及其重要性。
倫理之價值不在於個人。
強調，互惠、團結、信任、傳統美德…
發現倫理原則之方法是：嘗試詮釋與定義已存在於真實現存團體生活方式中的價值。
個人是屬於特定文化、傳統、社群下的自我。
自我認同- 受到社群價值觀所影響。
社群價值、傳統；但不是單一套正義原則。
Charles Taylor , 自我不可能與社群傳統文化脫離。
人是根屬於社群脈絡下而存在。
社群文化乃先於個人而存在，是構成自我認同的因素。
人際關係是處於對話的結構狀態。
Self identity and significant others, interaction and recognition.
愛國心及道德價值觀：是一種基於對社群共同歷史記憶，共同命運所自然產生之情感及價值觀。
會在成員參與社群事務中逐漸增強，形成集體認同。
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harvard prof. michael sandel - justice lecture 1-4.
第1講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHHa4ETr2jE&feature=youtube_gdata_player
intro; utilitarianism; J Bentham;
第2講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCx3O3gygok&feature=youtube_gdata_player
critics on utilitarianism;
第3講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EwJRUzVYxk&feature=youtube_gdata_player
J S Mill 's utilitarianism ;
critics on it;
taxation as a theft ?
第4講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9btigv8l4s&feature=youtube_gdata_player
liberalism, negative freedom.
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHHa4ETr2jE&feature=youtube_gdata_player
intro; utilitarianism; J Bentham;
第2講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCx3O3gygok&feature=youtube_gdata_player
critics on utilitarianism;
第3講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EwJRUzVYxk&feature=youtube_gdata_player
J S Mill 's utilitarianism ;
critics on it;
taxation as a theft ?
第4講-正義：一場思辨之旅-Michael Sandel
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9btigv8l4s&feature=youtube_gdata_player
liberalism, negative freedom.
Fwd: 政府再造, 全球化，政府治理，Tw
globalization, good governance, civil society, public-private partnership
Subject: 政府再造的基本精神：小而美或小而能？全球化，政府治理，Tw
http://research.ncnu.edu.tw/proj5/staff/https___webmail.ncnu.edu.tw_cgi-bin_downfile_B_22728212196_tmp1.pdf_9803%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E5%8C%96%E8%A7%80%E9%BB%9E%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86_T_D%E9%A3%9B%E8%A8%8A.pdf_HTTP_COOKIE=%20key=$F111F65F.S95106520_tw%26fake=_9803%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E5%8C%96%E8%A7%80%E9%BB%9E%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86_T_D%E9%A3%9B%E8%A8%8A.pdf
Subject: 政府再造的基本精神：小而美或小而能？全球化，政府治理，Tw
http://research.ncnu.edu.tw/proj5/staff/https___webmail.ncnu.edu.tw_cgi-bin_downfile_B_22728212196_tmp1.pdf_9803%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E5%8C%96%E8%A7%80%E9%BB%9E%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86_T_D%E9%A3%9B%E8%A8%8A.pdf_HTTP_COOKIE=%20key=$F111F65F.S95106520_tw%26fake=_9803%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E5%8C%96%E8%A7%80%E9%BB%9E%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86_T_D%E9%A3%9B%E8%A8%8A.pdf
2012年9月6日星期四
請閱讀：「澳門華人政治文化縱向研究」，第一至三章。
http://www.books.com.tw/exep/prod/booksfile.php?item=0010535404
Pls find the book from library or bookshop
Pls find the book from library or bookshop
2012年9月2日星期日
good governance - reference papers - tw
治理和善治引論
sex.ncu.edu.tw/course/Michel%20Foucault/link/fou_link02.htm - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
治理和善治引論. 作者：俞可平（資料來源：天府評論－行政法論壇）. 1989年世界銀行
在概括當時非洲的情形時，首次使用了"治理危機"（crisis in governance），此後" ...
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從共治到善治以考試院的訓練工作為例
www.exam.gov.tw/public/Data/01131750371.pdf - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
置」、「政府部門的運作」及「政府各部門關係」來討論善治政. 府。 一、善治的指標 ......
年2 月11 日新聞稿)， http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4?
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sex.ncu.edu.tw/course/Michel%20Foucault/link/fou_link02.htm - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
治理和善治引論. 作者：俞可平（資料來源：天府評論－行政法論壇）. 1989年世界銀行
在概括當時非洲的情形時，首次使用了"治理危機"（crisis in governance），此後" ...
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
從共治到善治以考試院的訓練工作為例
www.exam.gov.tw/public/Data/01131750371.pdf - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
置」、「政府部門的運作」及「政府各部門關係」來討論善治政. 府。 一、善治的指標 ......
年2 月11 日新聞稿)， http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4?
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week 2 - stpa - lecture notes - DR SUNNY CHAN
Wk 2- stpa,,, 2-9-2012
管治的理念
公共行政 -- 何謂「善治」good governance ？
民主、自由、人權、正義、公平、繁榮、安定？
資本主義與自由，Milton Friedman 。政府在資本主義自由社會裡有什麼角色？
自由主義與民主制度。從美國獨立宣言說起。西方國家的民主制度是怎樣？
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人權、自然法精神
人權的故事，video （歷史發展）
http://tw.humanrights.com/what-are-human-rights/brief-history/cyrus-cylinder.html
人權簡史
人權議題有什麼重要文件？
居魯士銘筒（西元前539年）
居魯士大帝的人權法令以阿卡德文刻在陶製的圓筒上。
西元前539年，古波斯帝國的第一位國王：居魯士大帝，解放了巴比倫的奴隸。
西元前539年，居魯士大帝（古波斯帝國的第一位國王）的軍隊，征服了巴比倫城。他接下去的行動，代表著人類進展了一大步。他解放所有的奴隸，並宣布所有人都有權利選擇他們自己的宗教信仰，並且建立起每個種族平等的地位。他的這些命令都以阿卡德語和楔形文字，記錄在陶製的圓筒上。
這就是今日所知的居魯士銘筒。這個古老記錄現今被認為是世界上第一份關於人權的憲章。它被翻譯成聯合國的六種官方語言。它的條款相當於《世界人權宣言》的前四條。
人權的傳播
人權的想法迅速地從巴比倫傳到印度，希臘，最後到了羅馬。羅馬出現了「自然法」的概念，他們觀察到，人在生活中，傾向於遵守某些不成文的法則。因此羅馬法律中的理性概念，是源自於事物的本質。
維護個人權利的憲章，例如《大憲章》(1215年)，《權利請願書》(1628年)，《美國憲法》(1787年)，法國《人民與公民權利宣言》(1789年)，和《美國人權法案》(1791年)是當今許多人權文件的先驅。
《大憲章》(1215年)
《大憲章》在1215年由英國國王親自簽署，是人權史上的轉捩點。
在歷史演進的過程中，《大憲章》可說是最有意義和影響力的早期文獻。它對於今日英語世界的憲法有著根本的影響。
1215年，英國約翰國王違反了數則英國古老法律和風俗。英國人民強迫他簽署《大憲章》，當中所列舉的，就是後來所謂的人權。其中一些條款包括：教會有權免於政府的干涉：所有自由的公民有權可以擁有和繼承財產，並受保護免於過度課稅。它確立了寡婦擁有財產而選擇不再婚的權利，也確立了法定訴訟程序和法律之前人人平等的原則。它也包含了禁止賄賂，和官員行為不端的條款。
《大憲章》普遍被視為現代民主發展中一份最重要的法律文件，它是爭取自由的過程中，一個重要的轉捩點。
《權利請願書》(1628年)
1628年英國議會向查理一世國王遞交公民自由的請願書。
歷史上，人權發展的下一個里程碑就是《權利請願書》。1628年由英國國會制定，並呈遞給國王查理一世，作為民權的聲明。由於查理國王不受歡迎的外交政策，使國會拒絕提供經費加以支持。因此，查理國王的政府強行向民間徵稅，軍隊也進駐民房，以節省經費。同時他強行拘捕和監禁反對這些政策的人，因此導致英國國會對查理一世和喬治 維利爾斯（白金漢公爵）產生強烈不滿。《權利請願書》是由愛德華 柯克爵士所發起的，他根據早期的法規和憲章，主張四項原則：(1)在沒有國會的同意下，不得徵收稅金；(2)在沒有審判的情況下，不可以拘捕或監禁人民（重申人身保護權利）；(3)軍隊不得佔住民房，並且(4)戒嚴令不可以用於和平時期。
《美國獨立宣言》(1776年)
1776年湯瑪士 傑佛遜寫下美國獨立宣言。
1776年7月4日，美國國會通過《獨立宣言》。湯瑪士 傑佛遜是主要起草人。他在宣言中正式說明，在美國革命戰爭爆發一年多後，美國國會為何於7月2日投票通過，正式宣布美國脫離英國獨立。同時聲明，美國13個殖民地不再屬於大英帝國。國會以幾種形式發表《獨立宣言》。《獨立宣言》最初以報紙的形式出版，廣泛發給民眾閱讀。
以哲學的觀點來說，《獨立宣言》強調兩個主題：個人權利和革命的權利。這些想法逐漸受到美國人普遍接受，並傳播到世界各地，特別影響到法國大革命。
《美國憲法》(1787年)及《人權法案》(1791年)
美國憲法的權利法案保障美國國民基本的自由。
《美國憲法》於1787年夏天在費城寫下，這是美國聯邦政府系統的基本法源，也是西方世界劃時代的憲章。它是目前仍在使用中，最古老的一部國家成文憲法，定義了政府主要部門及其權限，和公民的基本權利。
《美國憲法》的前十個修正案──《人權法案》─於1791年12月15日生效，限制美國聯邦政府的權限，保護所有在美國領土之公民，居民和訪客的權利。
《人權法案》保障言論自由，宗教信仰自由，持有和攜帶武器的權利，集會自由和請願自由。它也禁止不合理的搜索和扣押，殘酷和非常態的刑罰，以及禁止強迫認罪。它所提供的法律保護有：禁止國會立法制定國教；除非經過正當的法律程序，禁止聯邦政府剝奪任何人的生命，自由或財產。在聯邦刑事案件中，除非根據大陪審團的報告或起訴書，任何人不受死刑或重罪的審判。在一般刑事訴訟案中，被告有權在犯案發生的州和地區，由公正陪審團迅速公開審理，並禁止重複起訴同一罪行.
1789年在法國大革命後，《法國人權宣言》賦予免於壓迫的自由，稱為這是「公民意志的表現」。
《人民與公民權利宣言》(1789)
1789年，法國人民廢除君主專政，為法國第一共和的建立奠定基礎。在巴士底監獄風暴六個星期，廢止封建制度三週後，法國國民議會通過了《人民與公民權利宣言》(法文原文：Declaration des droits de L'Homme et du citoyen)，為法國的成文憲法踏出了第一步。
這份宣言強調應保障所有公民「自由、財產、安全和反抗壓迫的權利」。它主張法律的需求源自此一事實：「……在不妨礙社會其他成員能享有相同權利的情況下，每個人都能行使自然權利。」因此，這份宣言認為：法律「表達了普遍的意志」，其目的是促進平等的權利，和禁止「有害於社會的行為」。
第一次《日內瓦公約》(1864年)
1864年第一次締結的日內瓦公約，內容是關於照護傷兵。
1864年，由日內瓦委員會發起，瑞士聯邦委員會邀請16個歐洲國家和美國數州，參加在日內瓦舉行的會議。這場外交會議，締結了對待傷兵的醫療協定。
這個協定中所制定的主要法則，仍保留在日後的《日內瓦公約》中。在這項協定中規定：要平等對待並照顧受傷和生病的官兵；尊重醫療人員及其設備，並在醫療人員的交通工具和設備上，標示醒目的白底紅十字標誌。
聯合國(1945年)
1945年50個國家的代表齊聚舊金山，籌組聯合國，旨在捍衛推展和平。
二次大戰從1939年持續到1945年，到了大戰尾聲，歐亞各地的城市均成為廢墟。數百萬人死亡，以及數百萬人無家可歸或挨餓。德國首都柏林遭炸彈摧毀，並受到俄國軍隊包圍，試圖剿滅仍頑強抵抗的倖存者。在太平洋戰區，美國海軍陸戰隊仍然在沖繩等地，與堅守的日本軍抗戰。
1945年4月，來自五十個國家的代表在舊金山集會，他們十分樂觀，充滿希望。「聯合國國際組織會議」的目標是：要成立一個國際性的組織，宣揚和平及防止未來的戰爭。這個組織的理想目標，正如聯合國憲章草案的序文中所述：「我聯合國人民同茲決心，欲免後世再遭今代人類兩度身歷慘不堪言之戰禍。」
新的聯合國組織憲章於1945年10月24日生效，這一天被訂為聯合國日加以慶祝。
《世界人權宣言》(1948年)
世界人權宣言已激勵全世界制訂其他各項人權法規與條約。
1948年聯合國新的人權委員會獲得全世界的關注。在活躍的主席愛蓮娜 羅斯福（她是美國總統富蘭克林 羅斯福的遺孀，也是人權鬥士和美國駐聯合國代表）領導之下，這個委員會開始起草文案，也就是之後的《世界人權宣言》。愛蓮娜 羅斯福認為，這項宣言鼓舞人心，稱它為全人類的「國際大憲章」。這項宣言在1948年12月10日被聯合國採用。
該宣言在序言和第一條中，明確地聲明所有人與生俱來的權利：「對人權的無視和侮蔑已發展為野蠻暴行，這些暴行玷污了人類的良心，而一個人人享有言論和信仰自由，並免於恐懼和匱乏世界的來臨，已被宣布為普遍人民的最高願望…………人人生而自由，在尊嚴和權利上一律平等。」
這是歷史上首次將三十條人權整合和編輯成單獨的文獻，並且由聯合國的會員國宣誓要共同宣傳。結果，其中有很多條權利以各種不同的形式，編入當今民主國家的憲法條文中。
世界人權宣言
介紹
1945年10月24日，第二次世界大戰之後，為了避免未來爆發國際間衝突，釀成下一代的慘劇，因此組成國際組織，聯合國就此誕生。
全世界各地的聯合國代表於1948年12月10日正式採用世界人權宣言。
聯合國憲章建構出六個主體，包括：大會，安全理事會，國際法庭，以及和人權有關的經濟社會理事會。
聯合國憲章賦予經濟社會理事會權利，來建立「經濟和社會領域的委員會，並推廣人權……」。其中之一便是聯合國人權委員會。在主席愛蓮娜 羅斯福的倡導之下，人權委員會開始起草《世界人權宣言》。
這項宣言是各地區的代表共同起草的，包含各地方的法律傳統。在1948年12月10日正式被聯合國採用，是目前最廣泛使用的人權文件，描述民主社會基本的條人權。
緊接著這項歷史性議案之後，聯合國大會要求所有會員國發表此宣言的內容，並且要「讓它在學校與教育機構裡被宣揚、展示、閱讀和解釋，不能因為國家或領土的政治地位而有所差別」。
《世界人權宣言》是一部活的文件，目前已被視為是全球人民與政府的契約。根據金氏世界紀錄，這是全球翻譯版本最多的文件。
國際人權公約
http://tw.humanrights.com/what-are-human-rights/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/preamble.html
三十項人權內容
世界人權宣言
全文
第一條
人人生而自由，在尊嚴和權利上一律平等。他們賦有理性和良心，並應以兄弟關係的精神相對待。
第二條
人人有資格享受本宣言所載的一切權利和自由，不分種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教、政治或其他見解、國籍或社會出身、財產、出生或其他身份等任何區別。
並且不得因一人所屬的國家或領土其政治的、行政的或者國際的地位之不同而有所區別，無論該領土是獨立領土、託管領土、非自治領土或者處於其他任何主權受限制的情況之下。
第三條
人人有權享有生命、自由和人身安全。
第四條
任何人不得使為奴隸或奴役；一切形式的奴隸制度和奴隸買賣，均應予以禁止。
第五條
任何人不得加以酷刑，或施以殘忍的、不人道的或侮辱性的待遇或刑罰。
第六條
人人在任何地方有權被承認在法律前的人格。
第七條
法律之前人人平等，並有權享受法律的平等保護，不受任何歧視。人人有權享受平等保護，以免受違反本宣言的任何歧視行為以及煽動這種歧視的任何行為之害。
第八條
任何人當憲法或法律所賦予他的基本權利遭受侵害時，有權由合格的國家法庭對這種侵害行為作有效的補救。
第九條
任何人不得加以任何逮捕、拘禁或放逐。
第十條
人人完全平等地有權由一個獨立而無偏倚的法庭進行公正的和公開的審訊，以確定他的權利和義務並判定對他提出的任何刑事指控。
第十一條
1. 凡受刑事控告者，在未經獲得辯護上所需的一切公開審判，而依法證實有罪以前，有權被視為無罪。
2. 任何人的任何行為或疏忽，在其發生時依國家法或國際法均不構成刑事罪者，不得被判為犯有刑事罪。刑罰不得重於犯罪時所適用的法律規定。
第十二條
任何人的私生活、家庭、住宅和通信不得任意干涉，他的榮譽和名譽不得加以攻擊。人人有權享受法律保護，以免受這種干涉或攻擊。
第十三條
1. 人人在各國境內有權自由遷徙和居住。
2. 人人有權離開任何國家，包括其本國在內，並有權返回他的國家。
第十四條
1. 人人有權在其他國家尋求和享受庇護以避免迫害。
2. 在真正由於非政治性的罪行，或違背聯合國的宗旨和原則的行為而被起訴的情況下，不得援用此種權利。
第十五條
1. 人人有權享有國籍。
2. 任何人的國籍不得任意剝奪，亦不得否認其改變國籍的權利。
第十六條
1. 成年男女，不受種族、國籍或宗教的任何限制，有權婚嫁和成立家庭。他們在婚姻方面，在結婚期間和在解除婚約時，應有平等的權利。
2. 只有經男女雙方自由和完全的同意，才能締婚。
3. 家庭是天然和基本的社會單元，並應受社會和國家的保護。
第十七條
1. 人人得有單獨的財產所有權以及同他人合有的所有權。
2. 任何人的財產不得任意剝奪。
第十八條
人人有思想、良心和宗教自由的權利；此項權利包括改變他的宗教或信仰的自由，以及單獨或集體、公開或祕密地以教義、實踐、禮拜和戒律表示他的宗教或信仰的自由。
第十九條
人人有權享有主張和發表意見的自由；此項權利包括持有主張而不受干涉的自由，和透過任何媒介和不論國界以尋求、接受和傳遞消息和思想的自由。
第二十條
1. 人人有權享有和平集會和結社的自由。
2. 不得逼使任何人隸屬於某一團體。
第二十一條
1. 人人有直接或透過自由選擇的代表參與治理本國的權利。
2. 人人有平等機會參加本國公務的權利。
3. 人民的意志是政府權力的基礎；這一意志應以定期和真正的選舉予以表現，而選舉應依據普遍和平等的投票權，並以不記名投票或相當的自由投票程序進行。
第二十二條
每個人，作為社會的一員，有權享受社會保障，並有權享受他的個人尊嚴和人格的自由發展所必需的經濟、社會和文化方面各種權利的實現，這種實現是透過國家努力和國際合作，並依照各國的組織和資源情況。
第二十三條
1. 人人有權工作、自由選擇職業、享受公正和合適的工作條件，並享受免於失業的保障。
2. 人人有同工同酬的權利，不受任何歧視。
3. 每一個工作的人，有權享受公正和合適的報酬，保證使他本人和家屬有一個符合尊嚴的生活條件，必要時並輔以其他方式的社會保障。
4. 人人有為維護其利益而組織和參加工會的權利。
第二十四條
人人有享受休息和閒暇的權利，包括工作時間有合理限制和定期給薪休假的權利。
第二十五條
1. 人人有權享受為維持他本人和家屬的健康和福利所需的生活水準，包括食物、衣著、住房、醫療和必要的社會服務；在遭到失業、疾病、殘廢、守寡、衰老或在其他不能控制的情況下喪失謀生能力時，有權享受保障。
2. 母親和兒童有權享受特別照顧和協助。一切兒童，無論婚生或非婚生，都應享受同樣的社會保護。
第二十六條
1. 人人都有受教育的權利，教育應當免費，至少在初級和基本階段應如此。初級教育應屬義務性質。技術和職業教育應普遍設立。高等教育應根據成績而對所有人平等開放。
2. 教育的目的在於充分發展人的個性，並加強對人權和基本自由的尊重。教育應促進各國、各種族或各宗教集團間的了解、容忍和友誼，並應促進聯合國維護和平的各項活動。
3. 父母對其子女所應受的教育的種類，有優先選擇的權利。
第二十七條
1. 人人有權自由參加社會的文化生活，享受藝術，並分享科學進步及其產生的福利。
2. 人人對由於他所創作的任何科學、文學或美術作品而產生的精神的和物質的利益，享有受到保護的權利。
第二十八條
人人有權要求一種社會的和國際的秩序，在這種秩序中，本宣言所載的權利和自由能獲得充分實現。
第二十九條
1. 人人對社會負有義務，因為只有在社會中他的個性才可能得到自由和充分的發展。
2. 人人在行使他的權利和自由時，只受法律所確定的限制，確定此種限制的唯一目的在於保證對旁人的權利和自由給予應有的承認和尊重，並在一個民主的社會中適應道德、公共秩序和普遍福利的正當需要。
3. 這些權利和自由的行使，無論在任何情形下均不得違背聯合國的宗旨和原則。
第三十條
本宣言的任何條文，不得解釋為默許任何國家、集團或個人有權進行任何旨在破壞本宣言所載的任何權利和自由的活動或行為。
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人權侵犯
人權倡導者同意，儘管《世界人權宣言》已發行了六十年，但人權仍然是個夢想，並未實現。侵犯人權的情形依然存在於世界的每一個角落。舉例來說，2009年國際特赦組織世界報告和其他的來源，都顯示出：
• 至少在81個國家，有人遭到拷打以及虐待。
• 至少在54個國家，有人要面對不公平的審判。
• 至少在77個國家，表達的自由會受到限制。
不只那樣，特別是婦女和小孩在許多方面的權益受到漠視，很多國家的新聞媒體並不自由。異議者經常受到長期的壓制。雖然這60年內，人權有一些進展，可是今日的世界依然充斥著侵犯人權的現象。
為了幫助你瞭解世界各地的真實狀況，這個單元提供了違反世界人權宣言(UDHR)其中六條的例子。
第三條：自由生存的權利
「人人有權享有生命、自由和人身安全。」
2007年，在阿富汗，估計有6500人於武裝衝突中喪生，近一半的平民死於暴徒手中。數百位平民也因武裝團體的自殺攻擊而喪生。
根據巴西官方統計，2007年警察至少殺了1,260人，這是至今最高人數。所有事件都被官方視為「抵抗行動」，幾乎沒有或完全沒有調查。
在烏干達，每週國內流亡難民營有1500人死亡。根據世界衛生組織統計，已有50萬人死於這些難民營中。
越南當局強迫至少7萬5千位毒癮患者和娼妓到71家擁擠的「戒治」營。當局聲稱，這些人是感染愛滋病的「高危險群」，但沒有提供他們治療。
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美國的人權狀況怎樣？2011美国人权纪录发布
http://www.ynart.edu.cn/xwgg/yyyw/41058.shtml
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中國的人權狀況怎樣？
【中國真相最新新聞報導_李旺陽】21年牢獄災 李旺陽被困「棺材倉」
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAV2SF8Y_9Y&feature=youtube_gdata_player
美国人权报告提到128位中国维权人士名字
http://canyu.org/n50082c6.aspx
BBC中文網 - 國際新聞 - 美國國務院年度人權報告批評中國, 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/world/2012/05/120524_us_human_rights_report.shtml
中國當局重判劉曉波顯示其絕不容忍普世人權價值 | 中國人權
http://www.hrichina.org/hk/content/577
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澳門的人權狀況怎樣？
Search the related information.
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什麼是消極自由？積極自由？
消極自由：免受干預、免受外部障礙；意志及行為不受他人束縛。
但前提是個人自由伸張但不可以干犯他人的自由，不能傷害別人，別人也要有同等的自由。
「人為的干涉」包括：別人對身體的干涉、國家或法律的限制、社會輿論的壓力。
討論：私人擁有槍械合法化？
消極自由不考慮：使欲望消失的原因、缺乏自我實現\發奮向上的動機、心理\思維障礙因素、個人經濟困乏限制、個人能力不足、自然的限制。
討論：消極自由是否至高無上的價值？
討論：「有中學生沒錢補習，考不到名牌中學，也進不了大學。」他的自由是否被剝奪？
在多元主義中尋求消極自由，尊重個體選擇。
積極自由：擴大高層次的、高尚的、理性的、有道德覺醒之自我，努力尋求「自我實現」，不滿足於低層次的欲望。
個人自由之動力來自內在力量，兩種自我。
什麼是「真我」？「假我」？
「假我」受制於原始的動物天性，非理性，低俗，為滿足即時之欲望。
某些行為之自由是否比其他行為更重要、更有意義？吸煙的自由vs 健康的呼吸空氣。
討論：人和其他動物有何分別？
討論：個人能力發展、性格、價值觀是否需要在社群中培養？
德性之提升。
有意義地運用個人的自由及天賦才能，好像種子需要灌溉才能成長。
如何幫助個人消除內在障礙？鼓勵「自我實現」？例如：青年政策。
隱蔽青年問題？
個人和社群之高度互動，個人參與公共事務，個人亦受社群權威之影響。
討論：如何防止國家力量對個人意志的支配？
新加坡，「柏拉圖之哲學王」？
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憲政主義
政府成立之初，為了讓人民及政府本身在行事時能有一套依循的準則，由國民代表組成制憲大會並制定了憲法，後來更陸續由立法機關訂定各項法律、命令，這些律法背後代表的乃是大多數人民皆認同的行為準則規範，其背後反映的是多數人的價值，代表著受到這個國家內多數人認同的行為標準，例如一夫一妻、財產私有等觀念，這些觀念反映在法律當中，形成社會上共同的規範，希望透過這些規範避免各自的權益受到侵害，一旦人民的行為與這些規範衝突時，公權力便會依法介入，透過懲戒違法行為，期望能貫徹平等及法治原則，最終達到保障自由權利的目標。
在憲政主義中，平等及法治政治等原則被視為保障個人權利不可或缺的手段，而這些原則要被落實，法律的訂定乃是極為重要的關鍵。
現代民主國家多奉行憲政主義，憲政主義下的「法治政治」觀念更是深值人心。憲政主義乃是一種價值，其核心目標為保障人民之自由權利，並透過法治政治等觀念的落實達到保障自由權利之目的。
自由權利 -- 對自由權利保障的重視起源於啟蒙運動時思想家們提出的理論，洛克在《政府論次講》中提到：
「自然狀態有一種為人人所應遵守的自然法對它起著支配的作用；而理性，也就是自然法，教導著有意遵從理性的全人類：人們既然都是平等和獨立的，任何人就不得侵害他人的生命、健康、自由或財產。」
人們的生命、健康、自由或財產乃是自然法保障的範圍，是永恆及普遍存在的。洛克假設人們的「自然狀態」為一平等、自由的狀態，人人受理性的約束，每個個體都是獨立且平等的，誰都不會侵害他人之生命生命、健康、自由或財產。然而，人性除了理性的一面之外，亦有私慾、貪念的存在，使得上述的情況僅能出現於理想世界。現實生活中，人們往往因過度追求個人私益而侵害他人，干擾了理性也造成秩序的混亂，使各自的生命財產受到威脅。為了解決這些問題，人們集合起來成立一政治共同體（即政府），在人民的同意下，將一部分的權利交予政府，期望藉由公權力懲戒侵犯他人權益之行為，最終得以保障每個人的生命、財產。為使政治共同體能確實執行保障人民的權利的任務，延伸出了人民結社及參政等權利。
最初，人民組成立法機關，親自參與國家法律的制定，然而，隨著國家日漸發展，當國家人數增加時，自然無法讓所有人參與法律的制定，於是便發展出「代議制度」，由人民選出一小群人代表眾人行使立法的權利。在自由主義的觀念下，立法者乃是基於社會共同承認的規則，代理公民行使權利，協議出彼此都能接受的社會規範，除非是出現了代理瑕疵，否則都被視為是人民所為，這些規範也被視為是人民共同同意的規範。這些規範訂定的目的即是為了避免混亂的情況再度出現，同時也規範政府的運行。為了維持社會秩序，無論是政府或人民皆應依法行事。
法治政治 -- 因為每個人的自由與其他人的自由會有所衝突，為了避免衝突和解決衝突，所以自由的實現，必得要在法治和有限政府的環境中方有其可能。法治政治是保障自由權利的重要手段之一，意指統治者權力的行使及被治者權利的保障，均須依照憲法和法律秩序的規範，法律之前人人平等，統治者不得擅斷妄為侵害人民的自由權利，並且每個人所享有之權利及應負擔之義務皆應相同。人們訂定法律之後還要求政府及人民遵守法律、依法行事，避免政府公權力或個人自由過度擴張，導致他人自由權利受到侵犯，除此之外，法治政治中還包含了重要的平等精神。
平等原則是法治核心的一部分，透過對於權利平等的要求，法治的目的才能真正被落實，也唯有透過平等原則的堅持，良善的法律才有可能被制定出來，與法治產生相互的作用，在權利平等之下，所有人平等地受到無差別的法律保障與限制。平等原則之內不允許任何形式的特權存在，否則個人權利將再次受到侵害。
憲政主義的核心價值即是自由權利，而法律的出現及法治政治皆是做為保障人民不可或缺的手段之一，為了保障自由權利，憲政主義及平等原則必須被實踐於生活之中。
憲政主義（constitutionalism）是西方政治思想史上一種主張以憲法體系約束國家權力、規定公民權利的學說或理念，也是目前西方民主國家的現狀。這種理念要求政府所有權力的行使都納入憲法的軌道，並受憲法的制約，使政治運作進入法律化理想狀態。憲法強調法律具有凌駕於包括政府在內的一切的法治（rule of law）的必要性。
憲政是民主制度的基礎和保障，同時也是對民主政治的制衡，在憲政國家，政府和公民的行為都是有邊界的，不能互相僭越，政府所代表的行為世界是公部門，相對來說公民的行為世界稱作公民社會。
憲政的根本作用在於防止政府（包括民主政府）權力的濫用（即有限政府），維護公民普遍的自由和權利。
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民粹主義populism
社群主義 Communitarianism
後馬克思主義
1996/10/25 先驅 //後馬克思主義與工人階級// 劉宇凡
http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/66574
後現代主義。
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討論：澳門青年需要怎樣的青年政策？
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Group work : 請參考一些近年國際人權研究資料，嘗試分析下列那一個地區\國家政府之人權維護是最差：澳門、香港、中國大陸、台灣、新加坡、緬甸、北韓、印尼。須要有事實或証據支持論點。(1000-2000 字）。必須要有註腳標示參考資料來源。
Submission by week 3
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Best wishes
From 陳卓華博士, Dr Sunny Chan
香港中文大學政治與行政學博士，
英國 Lancaster University 社會學碩士，
澳門特區政府多項公共政策調查研究項目總監（交通，青少年問題，環保，城市規劃，公共行政改革，科技政策等），
澳門電台「澳門廣場 」及澳廣視「風火台」節目客席主持，
思匯網絡政策研究總監，
澳廣視「城市新角度」電視節目策劃，
文化旅遊及歷史文化遺產城區研究顧問，
地產發展商會顧問，
的士司機互助會顧問。
Cwchan@ipm.edu.mo
Tel. +853-66357631 ; 66485225
管治的理念
公共行政 -- 何謂「善治」good governance ？
民主、自由、人權、正義、公平、繁榮、安定？
資本主義與自由，Milton Friedman 。政府在資本主義自由社會裡有什麼角色？
自由主義與民主制度。從美國獨立宣言說起。西方國家的民主制度是怎樣？
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人權、自然法精神
人權的故事，video （歷史發展）
http://tw.humanrights.com/what-are-human-rights/brief-history/cyrus-cylinder.html
人權簡史
人權議題有什麼重要文件？
居魯士銘筒（西元前539年）
居魯士大帝的人權法令以阿卡德文刻在陶製的圓筒上。
西元前539年，古波斯帝國的第一位國王：居魯士大帝，解放了巴比倫的奴隸。
西元前539年，居魯士大帝（古波斯帝國的第一位國王）的軍隊，征服了巴比倫城。他接下去的行動，代表著人類進展了一大步。他解放所有的奴隸，並宣布所有人都有權利選擇他們自己的宗教信仰，並且建立起每個種族平等的地位。他的這些命令都以阿卡德語和楔形文字，記錄在陶製的圓筒上。
這就是今日所知的居魯士銘筒。這個古老記錄現今被認為是世界上第一份關於人權的憲章。它被翻譯成聯合國的六種官方語言。它的條款相當於《世界人權宣言》的前四條。
人權的傳播
人權的想法迅速地從巴比倫傳到印度，希臘，最後到了羅馬。羅馬出現了「自然法」的概念，他們觀察到，人在生活中，傾向於遵守某些不成文的法則。因此羅馬法律中的理性概念，是源自於事物的本質。
維護個人權利的憲章，例如《大憲章》(1215年)，《權利請願書》(1628年)，《美國憲法》(1787年)，法國《人民與公民權利宣言》(1789年)，和《美國人權法案》(1791年)是當今許多人權文件的先驅。
《大憲章》(1215年)
《大憲章》在1215年由英國國王親自簽署，是人權史上的轉捩點。
在歷史演進的過程中，《大憲章》可說是最有意義和影響力的早期文獻。它對於今日英語世界的憲法有著根本的影響。
1215年，英國約翰國王違反了數則英國古老法律和風俗。英國人民強迫他簽署《大憲章》，當中所列舉的，就是後來所謂的人權。其中一些條款包括：教會有權免於政府的干涉：所有自由的公民有權可以擁有和繼承財產，並受保護免於過度課稅。它確立了寡婦擁有財產而選擇不再婚的權利，也確立了法定訴訟程序和法律之前人人平等的原則。它也包含了禁止賄賂，和官員行為不端的條款。
《大憲章》普遍被視為現代民主發展中一份最重要的法律文件，它是爭取自由的過程中，一個重要的轉捩點。
《權利請願書》(1628年)
1628年英國議會向查理一世國王遞交公民自由的請願書。
歷史上，人權發展的下一個里程碑就是《權利請願書》。1628年由英國國會制定，並呈遞給國王查理一世，作為民權的聲明。由於查理國王不受歡迎的外交政策，使國會拒絕提供經費加以支持。因此，查理國王的政府強行向民間徵稅，軍隊也進駐民房，以節省經費。同時他強行拘捕和監禁反對這些政策的人，因此導致英國國會對查理一世和喬治 維利爾斯（白金漢公爵）產生強烈不滿。《權利請願書》是由愛德華 柯克爵士所發起的，他根據早期的法規和憲章，主張四項原則：(1)在沒有國會的同意下，不得徵收稅金；(2)在沒有審判的情況下，不可以拘捕或監禁人民（重申人身保護權利）；(3)軍隊不得佔住民房，並且(4)戒嚴令不可以用於和平時期。
《美國獨立宣言》(1776年)
1776年湯瑪士 傑佛遜寫下美國獨立宣言。
1776年7月4日，美國國會通過《獨立宣言》。湯瑪士 傑佛遜是主要起草人。他在宣言中正式說明，在美國革命戰爭爆發一年多後，美國國會為何於7月2日投票通過，正式宣布美國脫離英國獨立。同時聲明，美國13個殖民地不再屬於大英帝國。國會以幾種形式發表《獨立宣言》。《獨立宣言》最初以報紙的形式出版，廣泛發給民眾閱讀。
以哲學的觀點來說，《獨立宣言》強調兩個主題：個人權利和革命的權利。這些想法逐漸受到美國人普遍接受，並傳播到世界各地，特別影響到法國大革命。
《美國憲法》(1787年)及《人權法案》(1791年)
美國憲法的權利法案保障美國國民基本的自由。
《美國憲法》於1787年夏天在費城寫下，這是美國聯邦政府系統的基本法源，也是西方世界劃時代的憲章。它是目前仍在使用中，最古老的一部國家成文憲法，定義了政府主要部門及其權限，和公民的基本權利。
《美國憲法》的前十個修正案──《人權法案》─於1791年12月15日生效，限制美國聯邦政府的權限，保護所有在美國領土之公民，居民和訪客的權利。
《人權法案》保障言論自由，宗教信仰自由，持有和攜帶武器的權利，集會自由和請願自由。它也禁止不合理的搜索和扣押，殘酷和非常態的刑罰，以及禁止強迫認罪。它所提供的法律保護有：禁止國會立法制定國教；除非經過正當的法律程序，禁止聯邦政府剝奪任何人的生命，自由或財產。在聯邦刑事案件中，除非根據大陪審團的報告或起訴書，任何人不受死刑或重罪的審判。在一般刑事訴訟案中，被告有權在犯案發生的州和地區，由公正陪審團迅速公開審理，並禁止重複起訴同一罪行.
1789年在法國大革命後，《法國人權宣言》賦予免於壓迫的自由，稱為這是「公民意志的表現」。
《人民與公民權利宣言》(1789)
1789年，法國人民廢除君主專政，為法國第一共和的建立奠定基礎。在巴士底監獄風暴六個星期，廢止封建制度三週後，法國國民議會通過了《人民與公民權利宣言》(法文原文：Declaration des droits de L'Homme et du citoyen)，為法國的成文憲法踏出了第一步。
這份宣言強調應保障所有公民「自由、財產、安全和反抗壓迫的權利」。它主張法律的需求源自此一事實：「……在不妨礙社會其他成員能享有相同權利的情況下，每個人都能行使自然權利。」因此，這份宣言認為：法律「表達了普遍的意志」，其目的是促進平等的權利，和禁止「有害於社會的行為」。
第一次《日內瓦公約》(1864年)
1864年第一次締結的日內瓦公約，內容是關於照護傷兵。
1864年，由日內瓦委員會發起，瑞士聯邦委員會邀請16個歐洲國家和美國數州，參加在日內瓦舉行的會議。這場外交會議，締結了對待傷兵的醫療協定。
這個協定中所制定的主要法則，仍保留在日後的《日內瓦公約》中。在這項協定中規定：要平等對待並照顧受傷和生病的官兵；尊重醫療人員及其設備，並在醫療人員的交通工具和設備上，標示醒目的白底紅十字標誌。
聯合國(1945年)
1945年50個國家的代表齊聚舊金山，籌組聯合國，旨在捍衛推展和平。
二次大戰從1939年持續到1945年，到了大戰尾聲，歐亞各地的城市均成為廢墟。數百萬人死亡，以及數百萬人無家可歸或挨餓。德國首都柏林遭炸彈摧毀，並受到俄國軍隊包圍，試圖剿滅仍頑強抵抗的倖存者。在太平洋戰區，美國海軍陸戰隊仍然在沖繩等地，與堅守的日本軍抗戰。
1945年4月，來自五十個國家的代表在舊金山集會，他們十分樂觀，充滿希望。「聯合國國際組織會議」的目標是：要成立一個國際性的組織，宣揚和平及防止未來的戰爭。這個組織的理想目標，正如聯合國憲章草案的序文中所述：「我聯合國人民同茲決心，欲免後世再遭今代人類兩度身歷慘不堪言之戰禍。」
新的聯合國組織憲章於1945年10月24日生效，這一天被訂為聯合國日加以慶祝。
《世界人權宣言》(1948年)
世界人權宣言已激勵全世界制訂其他各項人權法規與條約。
1948年聯合國新的人權委員會獲得全世界的關注。在活躍的主席愛蓮娜 羅斯福（她是美國總統富蘭克林 羅斯福的遺孀，也是人權鬥士和美國駐聯合國代表）領導之下，這個委員會開始起草文案，也就是之後的《世界人權宣言》。愛蓮娜 羅斯福認為，這項宣言鼓舞人心，稱它為全人類的「國際大憲章」。這項宣言在1948年12月10日被聯合國採用。
該宣言在序言和第一條中，明確地聲明所有人與生俱來的權利：「對人權的無視和侮蔑已發展為野蠻暴行，這些暴行玷污了人類的良心，而一個人人享有言論和信仰自由，並免於恐懼和匱乏世界的來臨，已被宣布為普遍人民的最高願望…………人人生而自由，在尊嚴和權利上一律平等。」
這是歷史上首次將三十條人權整合和編輯成單獨的文獻，並且由聯合國的會員國宣誓要共同宣傳。結果，其中有很多條權利以各種不同的形式，編入當今民主國家的憲法條文中。
世界人權宣言
介紹
1945年10月24日，第二次世界大戰之後，為了避免未來爆發國際間衝突，釀成下一代的慘劇，因此組成國際組織，聯合國就此誕生。
全世界各地的聯合國代表於1948年12月10日正式採用世界人權宣言。
聯合國憲章建構出六個主體，包括：大會，安全理事會，國際法庭，以及和人權有關的經濟社會理事會。
聯合國憲章賦予經濟社會理事會權利，來建立「經濟和社會領域的委員會，並推廣人權……」。其中之一便是聯合國人權委員會。在主席愛蓮娜 羅斯福的倡導之下，人權委員會開始起草《世界人權宣言》。
這項宣言是各地區的代表共同起草的，包含各地方的法律傳統。在1948年12月10日正式被聯合國採用，是目前最廣泛使用的人權文件，描述民主社會基本的條人權。
緊接著這項歷史性議案之後，聯合國大會要求所有會員國發表此宣言的內容，並且要「讓它在學校與教育機構裡被宣揚、展示、閱讀和解釋，不能因為國家或領土的政治地位而有所差別」。
《世界人權宣言》是一部活的文件，目前已被視為是全球人民與政府的契約。根據金氏世界紀錄，這是全球翻譯版本最多的文件。
國際人權公約
http://tw.humanrights.com/what-are-human-rights/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/preamble.html
三十項人權內容
世界人權宣言
全文
第一條
人人生而自由，在尊嚴和權利上一律平等。他們賦有理性和良心，並應以兄弟關係的精神相對待。
第二條
人人有資格享受本宣言所載的一切權利和自由，不分種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教、政治或其他見解、國籍或社會出身、財產、出生或其他身份等任何區別。
並且不得因一人所屬的國家或領土其政治的、行政的或者國際的地位之不同而有所區別，無論該領土是獨立領土、託管領土、非自治領土或者處於其他任何主權受限制的情況之下。
第三條
人人有權享有生命、自由和人身安全。
第四條
任何人不得使為奴隸或奴役；一切形式的奴隸制度和奴隸買賣，均應予以禁止。
第五條
任何人不得加以酷刑，或施以殘忍的、不人道的或侮辱性的待遇或刑罰。
第六條
人人在任何地方有權被承認在法律前的人格。
第七條
法律之前人人平等，並有權享受法律的平等保護，不受任何歧視。人人有權享受平等保護，以免受違反本宣言的任何歧視行為以及煽動這種歧視的任何行為之害。
第八條
任何人當憲法或法律所賦予他的基本權利遭受侵害時，有權由合格的國家法庭對這種侵害行為作有效的補救。
第九條
任何人不得加以任何逮捕、拘禁或放逐。
第十條
人人完全平等地有權由一個獨立而無偏倚的法庭進行公正的和公開的審訊，以確定他的權利和義務並判定對他提出的任何刑事指控。
第十一條
1. 凡受刑事控告者，在未經獲得辯護上所需的一切公開審判，而依法證實有罪以前，有權被視為無罪。
2. 任何人的任何行為或疏忽，在其發生時依國家法或國際法均不構成刑事罪者，不得被判為犯有刑事罪。刑罰不得重於犯罪時所適用的法律規定。
第十二條
任何人的私生活、家庭、住宅和通信不得任意干涉，他的榮譽和名譽不得加以攻擊。人人有權享受法律保護，以免受這種干涉或攻擊。
第十三條
1. 人人在各國境內有權自由遷徙和居住。
2. 人人有權離開任何國家，包括其本國在內，並有權返回他的國家。
第十四條
1. 人人有權在其他國家尋求和享受庇護以避免迫害。
2. 在真正由於非政治性的罪行，或違背聯合國的宗旨和原則的行為而被起訴的情況下，不得援用此種權利。
第十五條
1. 人人有權享有國籍。
2. 任何人的國籍不得任意剝奪，亦不得否認其改變國籍的權利。
第十六條
1. 成年男女，不受種族、國籍或宗教的任何限制，有權婚嫁和成立家庭。他們在婚姻方面，在結婚期間和在解除婚約時，應有平等的權利。
2. 只有經男女雙方自由和完全的同意，才能締婚。
3. 家庭是天然和基本的社會單元，並應受社會和國家的保護。
第十七條
1. 人人得有單獨的財產所有權以及同他人合有的所有權。
2. 任何人的財產不得任意剝奪。
第十八條
人人有思想、良心和宗教自由的權利；此項權利包括改變他的宗教或信仰的自由，以及單獨或集體、公開或祕密地以教義、實踐、禮拜和戒律表示他的宗教或信仰的自由。
第十九條
人人有權享有主張和發表意見的自由；此項權利包括持有主張而不受干涉的自由，和透過任何媒介和不論國界以尋求、接受和傳遞消息和思想的自由。
第二十條
1. 人人有權享有和平集會和結社的自由。
2. 不得逼使任何人隸屬於某一團體。
第二十一條
1. 人人有直接或透過自由選擇的代表參與治理本國的權利。
2. 人人有平等機會參加本國公務的權利。
3. 人民的意志是政府權力的基礎；這一意志應以定期和真正的選舉予以表現，而選舉應依據普遍和平等的投票權，並以不記名投票或相當的自由投票程序進行。
第二十二條
每個人，作為社會的一員，有權享受社會保障，並有權享受他的個人尊嚴和人格的自由發展所必需的經濟、社會和文化方面各種權利的實現，這種實現是透過國家努力和國際合作，並依照各國的組織和資源情況。
第二十三條
1. 人人有權工作、自由選擇職業、享受公正和合適的工作條件，並享受免於失業的保障。
2. 人人有同工同酬的權利，不受任何歧視。
3. 每一個工作的人，有權享受公正和合適的報酬，保證使他本人和家屬有一個符合尊嚴的生活條件，必要時並輔以其他方式的社會保障。
4. 人人有為維護其利益而組織和參加工會的權利。
第二十四條
人人有享受休息和閒暇的權利，包括工作時間有合理限制和定期給薪休假的權利。
第二十五條
1. 人人有權享受為維持他本人和家屬的健康和福利所需的生活水準，包括食物、衣著、住房、醫療和必要的社會服務；在遭到失業、疾病、殘廢、守寡、衰老或在其他不能控制的情況下喪失謀生能力時，有權享受保障。
2. 母親和兒童有權享受特別照顧和協助。一切兒童，無論婚生或非婚生，都應享受同樣的社會保護。
第二十六條
1. 人人都有受教育的權利，教育應當免費，至少在初級和基本階段應如此。初級教育應屬義務性質。技術和職業教育應普遍設立。高等教育應根據成績而對所有人平等開放。
2. 教育的目的在於充分發展人的個性，並加強對人權和基本自由的尊重。教育應促進各國、各種族或各宗教集團間的了解、容忍和友誼，並應促進聯合國維護和平的各項活動。
3. 父母對其子女所應受的教育的種類，有優先選擇的權利。
第二十七條
1. 人人有權自由參加社會的文化生活，享受藝術，並分享科學進步及其產生的福利。
2. 人人對由於他所創作的任何科學、文學或美術作品而產生的精神的和物質的利益，享有受到保護的權利。
第二十八條
人人有權要求一種社會的和國際的秩序，在這種秩序中，本宣言所載的權利和自由能獲得充分實現。
第二十九條
1. 人人對社會負有義務，因為只有在社會中他的個性才可能得到自由和充分的發展。
2. 人人在行使他的權利和自由時，只受法律所確定的限制，確定此種限制的唯一目的在於保證對旁人的權利和自由給予應有的承認和尊重，並在一個民主的社會中適應道德、公共秩序和普遍福利的正當需要。
3. 這些權利和自由的行使，無論在任何情形下均不得違背聯合國的宗旨和原則。
第三十條
本宣言的任何條文，不得解釋為默許任何國家、集團或個人有權進行任何旨在破壞本宣言所載的任何權利和自由的活動或行為。
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人權侵犯
人權倡導者同意，儘管《世界人權宣言》已發行了六十年，但人權仍然是個夢想，並未實現。侵犯人權的情形依然存在於世界的每一個角落。舉例來說，2009年國際特赦組織世界報告和其他的來源，都顯示出：
• 至少在81個國家，有人遭到拷打以及虐待。
• 至少在54個國家，有人要面對不公平的審判。
• 至少在77個國家，表達的自由會受到限制。
不只那樣，特別是婦女和小孩在許多方面的權益受到漠視，很多國家的新聞媒體並不自由。異議者經常受到長期的壓制。雖然這60年內，人權有一些進展，可是今日的世界依然充斥著侵犯人權的現象。
為了幫助你瞭解世界各地的真實狀況，這個單元提供了違反世界人權宣言(UDHR)其中六條的例子。
第三條：自由生存的權利
「人人有權享有生命、自由和人身安全。」
2007年，在阿富汗，估計有6500人於武裝衝突中喪生，近一半的平民死於暴徒手中。數百位平民也因武裝團體的自殺攻擊而喪生。
根據巴西官方統計，2007年警察至少殺了1,260人，這是至今最高人數。所有事件都被官方視為「抵抗行動」，幾乎沒有或完全沒有調查。
在烏干達，每週國內流亡難民營有1500人死亡。根據世界衛生組織統計，已有50萬人死於這些難民營中。
越南當局強迫至少7萬5千位毒癮患者和娼妓到71家擁擠的「戒治」營。當局聲稱，這些人是感染愛滋病的「高危險群」，但沒有提供他們治療。
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美國的人權狀況怎樣？2011美国人权纪录发布
http://www.ynart.edu.cn/xwgg/yyyw/41058.shtml
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中國的人權狀況怎樣？
【中國真相最新新聞報導_李旺陽】21年牢獄災 李旺陽被困「棺材倉」
請來觀看 YouTube 上的影片：
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAV2SF8Y_9Y&feature=youtube_gdata_player
美国人权报告提到128位中国维权人士名字
http://canyu.org/n50082c6.aspx
BBC中文網 - 國際新聞 - 美國國務院年度人權報告批評中國, 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/world/2012/05/120524_us_human_rights_report.shtml
中國當局重判劉曉波顯示其絕不容忍普世人權價值 | 中國人權
http://www.hrichina.org/hk/content/577
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澳門的人權狀況怎樣？
Search the related information.
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什麼是消極自由？積極自由？
消極自由：免受干預、免受外部障礙；意志及行為不受他人束縛。
但前提是個人自由伸張但不可以干犯他人的自由，不能傷害別人，別人也要有同等的自由。
「人為的干涉」包括：別人對身體的干涉、國家或法律的限制、社會輿論的壓力。
討論：私人擁有槍械合法化？
消極自由不考慮：使欲望消失的原因、缺乏自我實現\發奮向上的動機、心理\思維障礙因素、個人經濟困乏限制、個人能力不足、自然的限制。
討論：消極自由是否至高無上的價值？
討論：「有中學生沒錢補習，考不到名牌中學，也進不了大學。」他的自由是否被剝奪？
在多元主義中尋求消極自由，尊重個體選擇。
積極自由：擴大高層次的、高尚的、理性的、有道德覺醒之自我，努力尋求「自我實現」，不滿足於低層次的欲望。
個人自由之動力來自內在力量，兩種自我。
什麼是「真我」？「假我」？
「假我」受制於原始的動物天性，非理性，低俗，為滿足即時之欲望。
某些行為之自由是否比其他行為更重要、更有意義？吸煙的自由vs 健康的呼吸空氣。
討論：人和其他動物有何分別？
討論：個人能力發展、性格、價值觀是否需要在社群中培養？
德性之提升。
有意義地運用個人的自由及天賦才能，好像種子需要灌溉才能成長。
如何幫助個人消除內在障礙？鼓勵「自我實現」？例如：青年政策。
隱蔽青年問題？
個人和社群之高度互動，個人參與公共事務，個人亦受社群權威之影響。
討論：如何防止國家力量對個人意志的支配？
新加坡，「柏拉圖之哲學王」？
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憲政主義
政府成立之初，為了讓人民及政府本身在行事時能有一套依循的準則，由國民代表組成制憲大會並制定了憲法，後來更陸續由立法機關訂定各項法律、命令，這些律法背後代表的乃是大多數人民皆認同的行為準則規範，其背後反映的是多數人的價值，代表著受到這個國家內多數人認同的行為標準，例如一夫一妻、財產私有等觀念，這些觀念反映在法律當中，形成社會上共同的規範，希望透過這些規範避免各自的權益受到侵害，一旦人民的行為與這些規範衝突時，公權力便會依法介入，透過懲戒違法行為，期望能貫徹平等及法治原則，最終達到保障自由權利的目標。
在憲政主義中，平等及法治政治等原則被視為保障個人權利不可或缺的手段，而這些原則要被落實，法律的訂定乃是極為重要的關鍵。
現代民主國家多奉行憲政主義，憲政主義下的「法治政治」觀念更是深值人心。憲政主義乃是一種價值，其核心目標為保障人民之自由權利，並透過法治政治等觀念的落實達到保障自由權利之目的。
自由權利 -- 對自由權利保障的重視起源於啟蒙運動時思想家們提出的理論，洛克在《政府論次講》中提到：
「自然狀態有一種為人人所應遵守的自然法對它起著支配的作用；而理性，也就是自然法，教導著有意遵從理性的全人類：人們既然都是平等和獨立的，任何人就不得侵害他人的生命、健康、自由或財產。」
人們的生命、健康、自由或財產乃是自然法保障的範圍，是永恆及普遍存在的。洛克假設人們的「自然狀態」為一平等、自由的狀態，人人受理性的約束，每個個體都是獨立且平等的，誰都不會侵害他人之生命生命、健康、自由或財產。然而，人性除了理性的一面之外，亦有私慾、貪念的存在，使得上述的情況僅能出現於理想世界。現實生活中，人們往往因過度追求個人私益而侵害他人，干擾了理性也造成秩序的混亂，使各自的生命財產受到威脅。為了解決這些問題，人們集合起來成立一政治共同體（即政府），在人民的同意下，將一部分的權利交予政府，期望藉由公權力懲戒侵犯他人權益之行為，最終得以保障每個人的生命、財產。為使政治共同體能確實執行保障人民的權利的任務，延伸出了人民結社及參政等權利。
最初，人民組成立法機關，親自參與國家法律的制定，然而，隨著國家日漸發展，當國家人數增加時，自然無法讓所有人參與法律的制定，於是便發展出「代議制度」，由人民選出一小群人代表眾人行使立法的權利。在自由主義的觀念下，立法者乃是基於社會共同承認的規則，代理公民行使權利，協議出彼此都能接受的社會規範，除非是出現了代理瑕疵，否則都被視為是人民所為，這些規範也被視為是人民共同同意的規範。這些規範訂定的目的即是為了避免混亂的情況再度出現，同時也規範政府的運行。為了維持社會秩序，無論是政府或人民皆應依法行事。
法治政治 -- 因為每個人的自由與其他人的自由會有所衝突，為了避免衝突和解決衝突，所以自由的實現，必得要在法治和有限政府的環境中方有其可能。法治政治是保障自由權利的重要手段之一，意指統治者權力的行使及被治者權利的保障，均須依照憲法和法律秩序的規範，法律之前人人平等，統治者不得擅斷妄為侵害人民的自由權利，並且每個人所享有之權利及應負擔之義務皆應相同。人們訂定法律之後還要求政府及人民遵守法律、依法行事，避免政府公權力或個人自由過度擴張，導致他人自由權利受到侵犯，除此之外，法治政治中還包含了重要的平等精神。
平等原則是法治核心的一部分，透過對於權利平等的要求，法治的目的才能真正被落實，也唯有透過平等原則的堅持，良善的法律才有可能被制定出來，與法治產生相互的作用，在權利平等之下，所有人平等地受到無差別的法律保障與限制。平等原則之內不允許任何形式的特權存在，否則個人權利將再次受到侵害。
憲政主義的核心價值即是自由權利，而法律的出現及法治政治皆是做為保障人民不可或缺的手段之一，為了保障自由權利，憲政主義及平等原則必須被實踐於生活之中。
憲政主義（constitutionalism）是西方政治思想史上一種主張以憲法體系約束國家權力、規定公民權利的學說或理念，也是目前西方民主國家的現狀。這種理念要求政府所有權力的行使都納入憲法的軌道，並受憲法的制約，使政治運作進入法律化理想狀態。憲法強調法律具有凌駕於包括政府在內的一切的法治（rule of law）的必要性。
憲政是民主制度的基礎和保障，同時也是對民主政治的制衡，在憲政國家，政府和公民的行為都是有邊界的，不能互相僭越，政府所代表的行為世界是公部門，相對來說公民的行為世界稱作公民社會。
憲政的根本作用在於防止政府（包括民主政府）權力的濫用（即有限政府），維護公民普遍的自由和權利。
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民粹主義populism
社群主義 Communitarianism
後馬克思主義
1996/10/25 先驅 //後馬克思主義與工人階級// 劉宇凡
http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/66574
後現代主義。
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討論：澳門青年需要怎樣的青年政策？
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Group work : 請參考一些近年國際人權研究資料，嘗試分析下列那一個地區\國家政府之人權維護是最差：澳門、香港、中國大陸、台灣、新加坡、緬甸、北韓、印尼。須要有事實或証據支持論點。(1000-2000 字）。必須要有註腳標示參考資料來源。
Submission by week 3
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Best wishes
From 陳卓華博士, Dr Sunny Chan
香港中文大學政治與行政學博士，
英國 Lancaster University 社會學碩士，
澳門特區政府多項公共政策調查研究項目總監（交通，青少年問題，環保，城市規劃，公共行政改革，科技政策等），
澳門電台「澳門廣場 」及澳廣視「風火台」節目客席主持，
思匯網絡政策研究總監，
澳廣視「城市新角度」電視節目策劃，
文化旅遊及歷史文化遺產城區研究顧問，
地產發展商會顧問，
的士司機互助會顧問。
Cwchan@ipm.edu.mo
Tel. +853-66357631 ; 66485225
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